Safety Campaign 2013(photo)

IMO - Ebola Virus Disease - Key Points Information

Ebola Virus Disease - Key Points Information 

IMO EVD Circular  PDF 189kb

EVD Advisory – Ocean Tankers

World Maritime Day 2014 Video Message (ဗီဒီယို)

Video message from IMO Secretary-General as he shares his views on this year's theme; IMO Conventions: Effective Implementation.

အဏၰ၀ါရဲ့ "Mt Ocean Osprey" Pirate Attack ခံလိုက္ရပါတယ္

 Zinlin Phyo feeling Fucking Pirate

 ** Breaking News **

Cargo အျပည့္ (full load) သယ္ေဆာင္လာေသာ ျမန္မာသေဘၤာသားမ်ားပါ၀င္တဲ့ "Mt Ocean Osprey" Ocean Tanker ပိုင္သေဘၤာသည္ စကၤာပူႏိုင္ငံဆိပ္ကမ္းမွ ရန္ကုန္ဆိပ္ကမ္းသို႔ ေမာင္းႏွင္လာစဥ္ West Coast of Thailand ျမန္မာေရပိုင္နက္ (ၿမိတ္ကြၽန္းစု)နားမေရာက္ခင္မွာ Pirate Attack ခံလိုက္ရပါတယ္ .....

  ျဖစ္စဥ္.....
Sept 22 ရက္ေန႔ Local Time (01:07 AM) နံနက္ ၁နာရီ၀န္းက်င္ေလာက္မွာ ေသနတ္ကိုင္ ဓားျပ ၆ ေယာက္ တက္လာၾကၿပီး Bridge ကိုအရင္ဆံုးတက္ duty officer second mate နဲ႔ duty AB တို႔အား လက္ျပန္ႀကိဳးတုပ္ ၿပီးေတာ့ သူႀကီးအခန္းကိုဆင္း သူႀကီးကိုပါ လက္ျပန္ႀကိဳးတုပ္ Crew ေတြအားလံုးကို bridge ေပါေခါ ခန္႔မွန္းခ်ိန္ နာရီ၀က္ မိနစ္ေလးဆယ္ အေတာအတြင္း Cabin ေတြအားလံုး႐ွိ ေငြနဲ႔ ပစၥည္းေတြယူၿပီး ခ်က္ျခင္းျပန္ဆင္းသြားၾကေၾကာင္း သိရပါတယ္ ... ခန္႔မွန္းေျခ အေမရိကန္ ေဒါလာ ၃၀၀၀၀ ေသာင္းခန္႔ႏွင့္ အျခား Personal Electronic Device မ်ားနဲ႔ Accessories ေတြပါသြားေၾကာင္း ထိခိုက္ ဒဏ္ရာ တစံုေယာက္မ မရ႐ွိေၾကာင္း ဓားျပမ်ားသည္ Fishing boat ျဖင့္လာေရာက္ျခင္းျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း သေဘၤာကေတာ့ ရန္ကုန္သို႔ ခရီးဆက္သြားေၾကာင္း သိ႐ွိရပါတယ္ .....
(သူႀကီး၏ ယခုျဖစ္စဥ္ေပါ သံုးသပ္ခ်က္)
> Duty ခ်ိန္တြင္း Look Out ယူေနၾကေသာ Duty Officer နဲ႔ Duty watch AB ရဲ႕ေပါ့ဆမႈျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း ...
> သေဘၤာပတ္ပတ္လည္ Razor Wire မ်ားတပ္ဆင္ထားျခင္းမ႐ွိျခင္း တံခါးေပါက္မ်ားအား ပိတ္ထားျခင္းမ႐ွိျခင္း Fire Hose မ်ား stand by အေနအထား မ႐ွိျခင္းတို႔ကို ေထာက္ျပသြားပါတယ္ .....
(Today Meeting)

ဒီေန႔ Meeting မွာ သူႀကီးက ေနာက္ voyage ေတြမွာ Malaca Strait ျဖတ္တိုင္း Razor Wire ေတြ တပ္ဆင္မည့္အေၾကာင္း ... Priacy Area မွာ တံခါးေပါက္ မ်ားအား အလံုပိတ္ထားမည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း... Priacy Watch မွာ Look Out duty ယူေနၾကသူေတြအားလံုး ဂ႐ုတစိုက္ ၾကည့္ကင္းတာ၀န္ယူရမည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း ... အေၾကာင္းအမ်ိဳးမ်ိဳးေၾကာင့္ Pirate Onboard ျဖစ္လာခဲ့ရင္ Muster List ထဲကအတိုင္း ကိုယ့္တာ၀န္အသီးသီးကို အေကာင္းဆံုး Team Work လုပ္ေဆာင္ရန္လိုေၾကာင္း ... ယခုအခ်ိန္ကတည္းက မိမိတို႔၏ ကိုယ္စီအခန္းတိုင္း အခန္းတိုင္းမွာ မိမိ၏ စာရြက္စာတမ္း ပိုက္ဆံႏွင့္ အေရးႀကီးပစၥည္းမ်ားအား အလြယ္တကူ သယ္ေဆာင္ႏိုင္ရန္ Stand by အေနအထား လုပ္ေဆာင္ထားသင့္ေၾကာင္း ... Pirate Onboard ေရာက္ခ်ိန္မွာ General Emergency Alarm သံ Announce လုပ္သံ ၾကားသည္ႏွင့္တၿပိဳင္နက္ မိမိအခန္းတြင္းမွ အသင့္အေနထား အိပ္ကိုလြယ္ Messroom ကိုသြားေနတဲ့လမ္းေၾကာင္းေပါ႐ွိ မိမိ လုပ္ေဖာ္ကိုင္ဖက္ အခန္းတိုင္း အခန္းတိုင္း တံခါးေခါက္ျခင္း Pirate Onboard ျဖစ္ေနပီျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း က်ယ္ေလာင္စြာေအာ္ၿပီး အသိေပးျခင္းတို့္ကို ျပဳလုပ္ရမည္ျဖစ္ၿပီး Bridge မွတာ၀န္က် အရာ႐ွိမွလည္း သက္ဆိုင္ရာ Radio Station, Coast Guard စသည္တို႔ကို Distress အသိေပးျခင္း VHF ျဖင့္ သေဘၤာအားလံုးကို အသိေပးျခင္း စသည္တို႔ကို လုပ္ေဆာင္ၿပီး Statellite Radio ျဖင့္ သတ္မွတ္ရာေနရာသို႔ လာေရာက္ရမည္ျဖစ္ပီး ထိုနည္းတူ Engine Room တြင္လည္း စက္ခ်ဳပ္ ႏွင့္အင္ဂ်င္နီယာမ်ားမွလည္း Engine Room တြင္း Shut Down ခ်ရန္လိုအပ္သည္မ်ား လုပ္ေဆာင္ၿပီး သတ္မွတ္ထားရာေနရာ Steering Gear Room တြင္ Crew အားလံုး Lock ခ်ၿပီး Rescue Team မ်ားေရာက္လာသည္ထိ ေစာင့္စားရမည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း .....
(ေနာက္ဆံုး သူႂကီးေျပာသြားတာကေတာ့ ေသနတ္မပါ ႐ိုး႐ိုးလက္နက္ကိုင္ ဓားျပဆိုရင္ အေျခအေနေပါမူတည္ၿပီး အားလံုး ညီညီၫြတ္ၫြတ္နဲ႔ ျပန္တီးဖို႔ အျမင့္ဆံုးတပ္လွန္႔လိုက္ေလသတည္း ....)

(ဒီေန႔ Meeting မွာေျပာသြားတဲ့အေၾကာင္းအရာေတြပါ လိုအပ္ခ်က္ေတြ႐ွိေနရင္ သည္းခံၾကပါ)
အားလံုးပဲေဘးကင္းၾကပါေစ... ကံေကာင္းၾကပါေစ...
အေသးစိတ္မသိရွိရ၍ လိုအပ္သည္မ်ား ႐ွိပါက ခြင့္လွြတ္ေပးၾကပါ သေဘၤာသား ညီကိုေတြ သတိထားလို႔ရေအာင္ တင္ေပးျခင္းပါ .......
(Thank A Lot Bro Zarni Zaw Hein##)

 O/osprey ရဲ့ေနာက္ဆက္တြဲသတင္း

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ဒီၿဖစ္ရပ္မွာေလွ်ာ္ေၾကးေငြ၅၀၀၀usd/ရရွိပါတယ္က်န္တာရံုးကစိုက္ေပါ့ေလ။
တိုက္တဳဲ့သူေတြကindoေတြလို႔
သိရတယ္၊ၿဖစ္စဥ္နဲ႔၂နာရီအၾကာအဲ့ဒီေနရာမွာပဲတၿခားလိုင္းကတစ္စီးအတိုက္ခံရ
ပါေသးတယ္ကုန္ေတြလဲသယ္သြားတယ္တဲ့။ဒို႔သေဘၤာမွာ"အ"crewေတြရွိသလို
သၾူကီးကကိုရီးယား၊စက္ခ်ဳပ္ကၿမန္မာပါ။
ပင္လယ္ေပ်ာ္

Information for Marine Engineers' Exam sept 18 2014

IMO, STCW Convention, DMA, Engineer Training Record Book
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IMO ဆိုတာ..UN ရဲ႔ အဖြဲ႔အစည္းတစ္ခုပါ..အဖြဲ႔၀င္ႏိုင္ငံ ၁၇၀ ရွိပါတယ္..။
ကမၻာႀကီးရဲ႔ ေရေႀကာင္းဘက္ဆိုင္ရာလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားကို ညွိႏွိဳင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ေပးတဲ႔
ႏိုင္ငံတကာ..အဖြဲ႔အစည္းႀကီးပါ..။

ကြ်န္ေတာ္တို႔.ၿမန္မာႏိုင္ငံက..လည္း အဖြဲ႔၀င္ ႏိုင္ငံ.ၿဖစ္ပါတယ္..။

အဲဒီအဖြဲ႔ႀကီးက..အဖြဲ႔၀င္မ်ား..က.သေဘာၤေတြ..ေရယာဥ္ေတြ..
အဲဒီေရယာဥ္ေတြရဲ႔..တည္ေဆာက္မွဳဒီဇိုင္းေတြ.
.ေရယာဥ္ေတြမွာ..တပ္ဆင္ရမဲ႔..ေခတ္မွီပစၥည္းကိရိယာေတြ..
အဲဒီေရယာဥ္ေတြေပၚမွာ..တာ၀န္ထမ္းေဆာင္ႀကမဲ႔..အရာရွိ.၀န္ထမ္းေတြ နဲ႔ ပတ္သက္ၿပီး ဆက္စပ္ၿပီး..
သဘာ၀ပါတ္၀န္းက်င္နဲ႔ပါတ္သက္လို႔..လိုအပ္တာေတြ..
ေဘးအႏၱရယ္ကင္းၿပီးလံုၿခံဳစိတ္ခ်ရဘို႔..နဲ႔ ပါတ္သက္လို႔..လိုအပ္တာေတြ..
ေရယာဥ္၀န္ထမ္းေတြရဲ႔..ေလ႔က်င္႔သင္ႀကားမွဳနဲ႔ပါတ္သက္လို႔..လိုအပ္တာေတြ..
ကို..အစည္းအေ၀းေတြ..ေခၚၿပီး..ေဆြးေႏြးႀက..တိုင္ပင္ႀက..ဆံုးၿဖတ္ႀက..သေဘာတူလက္မွတ္ေတြ..ေရးထိုးႀက..လိုက္နာရမဲ႔.စည္းကမ္း..လိုက္နာေဆာင္ရြက္ရမဲ႔.
သတ္မွတ္ရက္ေတြ..အတည္ၿပဳႀက..စသၿဖင္႔..ေဆာင္ရြက္ပါတယ္..။

အဲဒီသတ္မွတ္ခ်က္ေတြ..သေဘာတူညီခ်က္ေတြကို..အၿမဲတန္းသံုးသပ္ပါတယ္.။
ေခတ္နဲ႔အညီ.ေၿပာင္းလဲသတ္မွတ္ပါတယ္..။ Accident, Incident, ေတြအေပၚမွာ
မူတည္ၿပီး..ဥပေဒေတြ..သေဘာတူညီခ်က္ေတြ..ေၿပာင္းလဲၿပဳၿပင္ေလ႔..ရွိပါတယ္.။

အဲဒီလို..ေဆာင္ရြက္ရာမွာ..ႏိုင္ငံေတြခ်ည္းသာ..မဟုတ္ပါဘူး..။ တစ္ၿခားကြ်မ္းက်င္ပညာရွင္မ်ား၊ ေရေႀကာင္းလုပ္ငန္းရွင္မ်ား..စုေပါင္းထားတဲ႔..
အဖြဲ႔အစည္းေတြလည္း..ပါ၀င္ပါတယ္..။

Classification Societies ေတြ (IACS) ပါသလို..၊ ေရေႀကာင္းအင္ဂ်င္နီယာအဖြဲအစည္း (IMarEST), ေရယာဥ္ပိသုကာ အဖြဲ႔အစည္း၊ ေရေႀကာင္းပညာရွင္အဖြဲ႔အစည္း၊ေရေႀကာင္းဥပေဒပညာရွင္..စသၿဖင္႔..စသၿဖင္႔..ေရေႀကာင္းနဲ႔ပါတ္သက္တဲ႔..က႑ေပါင္းစံုက..အဖြဲ႔အစည္းေတြလည္း
ပါ၀င္ပါတယ္..။

STCW..ဆိုတာက..
International Conventions for
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
ပါ..
လုပ္ငန္းသဘာ၀.အရ..ပင္လယ္ကူး..ႏိုင္ငံၿခားသြား.သေဘာၤႀကီးေတြေပၚမွာ..
လူမ်ိဳးေပါင္းစံု..တြဲဘက္ၿပီး..အလုပ္လုပ္ႀကရပါတယ္..။
အဲဒီမွာ..Background Education Level ..ညီဘို႔..လိုလာပါတယ္..။
သင္ႀကားခဲ႔..သင္ယူခဲ႔..ေလ႔က်င္႔ခဲ႔..တာေတြ..မတူခဲ႔ရင္..အလုပ္မၿဖစ္ႏိုင္ပါဘူး.။
အဲဒီ..အတြက္..စံ..သတ္မွတ္တဲ႔..သေဘာပါ..။

၁၉၇၈..မွာ..စၿပီး..ၿပဌာန္းပါတယ္..။
၁၉၉၅..မွာ..ၿပင္ဆင္ပါတယ္..။
၂၀၁၀..မွာ..ေနာက္ဆံုးၿပင္ဆင္ပါတယ္..။

Convention..စာအုပ္ကေတာ႔..စာမ်က္ႏွာ..၂၀၀..၀န္းက်င္ရွိၿပီး..စံ..သတ္မွတ္ခ်က္ ေတြ..ဥပေဒပိုင္း..ဆိုင္ရာေတြ..မ်ားပါတယ္..။

မိမိတို႔.ရာထူး..တာ၀န္...အဆင္႔အလိုက္..
သင္ႀကားရမဲ႔..သင္တန္းတစ္ခုခ်င္းစီ..အလိုက္..
အေသးစိတ္..ထုတ္ၿပန္ထားတာ..ရွိပါတယ္..။
အဲဒါကို..Model Course လို႔..ေခၚပါတယ္..။

ဥပမာ..တတိယအင္ဂ်င္နီယာ..အဆင္႔..ရွိရမဲ႔သူမ်ား..သင္ႀကားရမဲ႔..
စာေတြ႔၊ လက္ေတြ႔နာရီ၊ သင္ႀကားရမဲ႔..ဘာသာရပ္မ်ား၊ သင္ႀကားခ်ိန္သတ္မွတ္နာရီမ်ား၊ သင္ႀကားမဲ႔.ဆရာေတြရဲ႔..အရည္အခ်င္းသတ္မွတ္ခ်က္၊သင္တန္း ေက်ာင္းေတြ၊ ေကာလိပ္ေတြ၊ တကၠသိုလ္ေတြ..မွာ..ရွိရမဲ႔..သင္ေထာက္ကူပစၥည္း၊
စတာ..စတာ..ေတြ..အတိအက်..ပါပါတယ္..။
ဒါေပမဲ႔..ကိုယ္႔ႏိုင္ငံအေၿခအေနအလိုက္..အေလ်ာ႔အတင္းလုပ္ခြင္႔ေတာ႔..ေပးထား ပါတယ္..။

တတိယ..အင္ဂ်င္နီယာအဆင္႔အတြက္..သင္ႀကားရမဲ႔..Model Course က.
Model Course 7.04 ၿဖစ္ပါတယ္..။
အင္ဂ်င္နီယာခ်ဳပ္ ၊ ဒုတိယအင္ဂ်င္နီယာ အဆင္႔အတြက္..သင္ႀကားရမွာက..
Model Course 7.02 ၿဖစ္ပါတယ္..။
လ်ွပ္စစ္နဲ႔အီလက္ထရြန္းနစ္ အင္ဂ်င္နီယာ အဆင္႔အတြက္..သင္ႀကားရမွာက..
Model Course 7.08..ပါ..။
ကုန္းပတ္..ေရေႀကာင္းဘက္ဆိုင္ရာ (ကုန္းပတ္) အရာရွိမ်ား..အတြက္လည္း..
အဲဒီလို..သူ႔အဆင္႔လိုက္..သတ္မွတ္..ၿပဌာန္းထားပါတယ္..။

အဲဒီလို..ေၿပာင္းလဲဘို႔..သတ္မွတ္ၿပီးရင္..၊ ႀကားထဲမွာ..အခ်ိန္ကာလ..တစ္ခု..ေပးပါတယ္..။
အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္..ေဆာင္ရြက္ဘို႔ပါ..။
STCW2010 Manila Amendments ရဲ႔..သတ္မွတ္ခ်က္ေတြနဲ႔အညီ.
စနစ္သစ္နဲ႔..ေလ႔က်င္႔သင္ႀကားထားတဲ႔..သူမ်ား..ၿဖစ္ရမယ္..။ စနစ္သစ္နဲ႔..ေလ႔က်င္႔သင္ႀကားထားၿပီးမွ..စနစ္သစ္.လက္မွတ္ထုတ္ေပးရမယ္..။
စနစ္သစ္လက္မွတ္ရွိသူမ်ားသာ..2017..မွာ..သေဘာၤေပၚမွာ..တာ၀န္ထမ္းေဆာင္ ခြင္႔ရွိပါ႔မယ္..။

အဲဒီလို..ႏိုင္ငံတစ္ကာ..သေဘာတူ..ထားတဲ႔..ကြန္ဗင္းရွင္းကို..အဖြဲ႔၀င္ႏိုင္ငံေတြက
လိုက္နာ..ေဆာင္ရြက္ၿခင္း.အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ၿခင္းရွိမရွိ..ကို..IMO ..က..လိုက္လံစစ္ေဆးပါတယ္..။ IMO Audit..ပါ..။
IMO မွာ..အဖြဲ႔၀င္ႏိုင္ငံအခ်င္းခ်င္း..အၿပန္အလွန္စစ္ေဆးခြင္႔လည္း. .ေပးထားပါတယ္..။
အဲဒီအတြက္..ဟိုတစ္ႏွစ္၊ ၂ႏွစ္ဆီက..EU..ကလာစစ္တာ..တို႔..၊ Malaysia က..လာစစ္တာ..တို႔..ရွိခဲ႔ပါတယ္..။
လာမဲ႔..ႏွစ္မွာ..IMO နဲ႔..တစ္ၿခား..Flag State ေတြက. လာစစ္ႏိုင္တယ္..လို႔..မွန္းဆ လို႔..ရပါတယ္..။
အဲဒီ..အတြက္..ၿမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ..အပိုင္းက..ၿပင္ဆင္ရမွာေတြ..အမ်ားႀကီးပါ..။

ဆက္ေရးပါဦးမယ္..။
၀င္းေအာင္
ေရေႀကာင္းေက်ာင္းဆရာ..

STCW 2010 Minila Amentmends သေဘာတူညီခ်က္ ENGINE DEPARTMENT ဒီကိုနွိပ္ပါ

Learning From Incidents

Monitor cargo tanks pressure to avoid over / under pressurization of tanks

Dangerous of islam virus ( ေၾကာက္စရာ အစၥလာမ္ ဗိုင္းရပ္စ္)

ဒီဗီဒီယိုေလးဟာ ေဟာ္လန္ႏိုင္ငံသားျဖစ္ေသာ Geert Wilders မွ အသက္အႏၱရာယ္ေတြၾကားမွ မိမိရဲ့အသက္ေဘးကို မငဲ့ကြက္ပဲ ကမၻာႀကီး၌ လ်ဳိ႔ ဝွက္နက္နဲၿပီး ေမးခြန္းမ်ားထုတ္ဖို႔ ခက္ခဲရန္အ တြက္ ပေဟဋိဆန္ေသာ လိမ္ညာမွဳ မ်ားျဖင့္ဖုန္းကြယ္ထားေသာ အစၥလာမ္ အယူဝါဒမွိဳင္းကို ရွင္းလင္းေျပာၾကား ဖြင့္ဟ ထုတ္ ေဖၚထားတဲ့ ဗီဒီယိုပဲျဖစ္ပါတယ္....... ဒီဗီဒီယိုဟာ ျမန္မာျဖစ္မွ ဗုဒၶဘာသာျဖစ္မွ လူႀကီးျဖစ္မွ ၾကည့္သင့္ တယ္ဆိုတဲ့ သေဘာအဓိပၸါယ္မ်ဳိးမသက္ေရာက္ပါဘူး မိမိတို႔ရဲ့ အမိေျမ အိုးအိမ္ စည္းစိမ္မ်ားႏွင့္တကြ မိမိတို႔ရဲ့အမ်ဳိးဘာသာ သာသနာကို ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ခ်င္ၾကတဲ့ မည္သည့္ ဘာသာဝင္ပဲျဖစ္ပါေစ မည့္လူမ်ဳိး မည္သည့္ႏိုင္ငံသားပင္ျဖစ္ပါေစ လူႀကီး လူလတ္ ကေလးမ်ားပင္ျဖစ္ပါေစ ျမန္မာစာ သို႔မဟုတ္ အဂၤလိပ္စကား နားလည္ေသာသူတိုင္း ၾကည့္ရွုေလ့လာသင့္ၾကပါေၾကာင္းအသိေပးအပ္ပါသည္။ Like , Share . download မ်ားလုပ္ထားလိုက္ၾကျခင္းျဖင့္ မသိၾကေသးေသာ မၾကည့္ဖူးၾကေသးေသာ မိမိတို႔ရဲ့ သားသမီးမ်ား ၊ ညီအကိုေမာင္ႏွမ်ား ၊ ေဆြမ်ဳိးသားခ်င္းမ်ားႏွင့္ သူငယ္ခ်င္းမိတ္ေဆြအေပါင္းအသင္းမ်ားတို႔အား ျပန္လည္ လည္မွ်ေဝျခင္းမ်ားျဖင့္ မိမိတို႔ရဲ့ အမ်ဳိးဘာသာသာသနာေတာ္ကို ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ႏိုင္ၾကပါေစ...

 ေၾကာက္စရာ အစၥလာမ္ ဗိုင္းရပ္စ္
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 ကံမေကာင္းစြာပဲ ျပဇာတ္ဆန္တဲ့ အခ်ိန္ေရာက္လာပါၿပီ ဥေရာပကို အလည္လာရင္းျဖင့္၄င္း ၊
ဒါမွမဟုတ္ မိဘေတြ၊ မိတ္ေဆြေတြ မိသားစုဝင္ေတြဆီကေန တဆင့္ ဥေရာပဟာ ပ်က္စီးျခင္း လမ္းေၾကာင္းေပၚေရာက္ေနၿပီဆိုတာ ခင္ဗ်ားတို႔ သိႏိုင္တယ္။ ဥေရာပဟာ ျပန္မရႏိုင္ေတာ့မယ့္ ဦးတည္ရာဆီကို နက္နဲ သိမ္ေမြ႔စြာ ေျပာင္းလဲေနတာကို မ်က္ျမင္ကိုယ္ေတြ႔ ျမင္ေနရ ပါၿပီ ။ ၿပီးေတာ့ ေရာ္နယ္ေရဂင္ ေျပာခဲ့သလို ဥေရာပတိုက္ကို အေမွာင္ထုႀကီးဆိုးခဲ့တဲ့ ႏွစ္ေတြဆီ တြန္းပို႔ေနတယ္။ ဥေရာပကို ေျပာင္းလဲပစ္ဖို႔ လုပ္ေဆာင္ေနၾကၿပီ။
ဒါဟာ ကမၻာႀကီးကို အစၥလာမ္ဘာသာ လႊမ္းမိုးရမယ္ဆိုတဲ့ စီမံကိန္းရဲ့ တစ္စိပ္ တစ္ပိုင္းပဲျဖစ္တယ္။ အစၥလာမ္ဆိုတာ ႏိုင္ငံေရး အေတြးအေခၚ တစ္ခုပဲ။ အစၥလာမ္ရဲ့ အသည္းႏွလံုးဟာ ကိုရမ္က်မ္းျဖစ္တယ္။ ကိုရမ္ဆိုတာက အမုန္းတရားေတြ ပြားမ်ားဖို႔ ၊ အၾကမ္းဖက္မွဳ ေတြလုပ္ဖို႔ ၊ သတ္ျဖတ္ဖို႔ ၊ ရက္စက္ ၾကမ္းက်ဳတ္ဖို႔ ၊ စစ္တိုက္ ဖို႔ အမိန္႔နာခံဖို႔ ေရးထားတဲ့ စာအုပ္တစ္အုပ္ပဲျဖစ္တယ္။ ကိုရမ္ဟာ အစၥလာမ္ဘာသာဝင္ မဟုတ္သူေတြကို သတ္ ျဖတ္ဖို႔ ညႊန္ၾကား အမိန္႔ေပးထားတယ္။ ကိုရမ္က်မ္းမွာ ဂ်ဴ းေတြကို ေမ်ာက္ေတြ ၊ ဝက္ေတြလို႔ ေရးထားတယ္။ ကိုရမ္ဆိုတာ အလႅာရဲ့ ပုဂၢိဳ လ္ေရးဆန္တဲ့ စကားလံုးပဲ ျဖစ္ တယ္ ။ ရွင္းလင္းတဲ့ အဓိပၸါယ္ေတာ့ မရွိဘူး ။ ဒါေၾကာင့္ အစၥလာမ္လိုအစြန္းေရာက္တဲ့ အျခားအရာမရွိဘူး။ ဟုတ္ပါတယ္ အစြန္းေရာက္ မြတ္ဆလင္ အေျမာက္အမ်ားရွိ တယ္ ဒါေပမယ့္ အစြန္းေရာက္တဲ့ အစၥလာမ္ေတာ့မရွိဘူး ။ မိုဟာမက္ဆိုတာ စစ္ေခါင္းေဆာင္တစ္ဦးျဖစ္တယ္။ သူဟာ အၾကမ္းဖက္သတ္ျဖတ္မွဳ ေတြ ၊ မြတ္ဆလင္ မဟုတ္ သူေတြကို တိုက္ခိုက္တဲ့ စစ္ပြဲေတြအတြက္ အစၥလာမ္ ဘာ သာကို အသံုးခ်ခဲ့တယ္။ မိုဟာမက္ဟာ ဂ်ဴ းေတြကိုသတ္ဖို႔ တိုက္ပြဲေပါင္း ၇၈ ခုတိုက္ ခဲ့တယ္။ အလႅာမွတပါး အျခားဘုရားမရွိဘူးလို႔ လူေတြက ဝန္ခံလာ တဲ့အထိတိုက္ရမယ္လို႔ အလႅာကငါ့ကို အမိန္႔ေပးခဲ့တယ္လို႔ မိုဟာမက္ကေျပာခဲ့တယ္။ သူ႔ကိုယ္သူလည္း အလႅာရဲ့ တမန္ေတာ္လို႔ ေျပာခဲ့တယ္ အစၥလာမ္ေတြအတြက္ အလံုးစံုေပ်ာ္ရႊင္မွဳဆိုတာ အလႅာအ တြက္ အျခားသူေတြကို သတ္ျခင္းနဲ႔ အသက္အေသခံျခင္းပဲ ျဖစ္တယ္။

 မိုဟာမက္ရဲ့ ရက္စက္မွဳေတြ ကိုရမ္က်မ္းရဲ့ ရက္စက္မွဳေတ ဟာ ဂ်ီဟတ္လုပ္သူေတြကို ယေန႔အထိ လႊမ္းမိုးေနဆဲ ျဖစ္တယ္။ သူတို႔ဟာ အျပစ္မဲ့ျပည္သူေတြကို သတ္ခဲ့တယ္ ၊ ဝါရွင္တန္၊ နယူးေယာက္ ၊ မက္ဒရစ္ ၊ လန္ဒန္ ၊ မြန္ဘိုင္းနဲ႔ အမ္စတာဒန္ ၿမိဳ႕ေတြမွာျဖစ္တယ္။ အစၥလာမ္ေတြဟာ အၿမဲပဲ ဥေရာပကို သိမ္းပိုက္ဖို႔ ႀကံစည္ေန ၾကတာဟာ အရင္ကတည္းကပဲ။ ခရစ္ယာန္ေတြရဲ့ ၿမိဳ႕ျဖစ္တဲ့ Constantinople ၿမိဳ႕ဟာ 15 ရာစုမွာ မြတ္ဆလင္ေတြေၾကာင့္ ပ်က္စီးခဲ့ရတယ္။ အခု 21 ရာစုမွာ အစၥလာမ္ေတြဟာ တစ္ႀကိမ္ျပန္ႀကိဳးစား လာၾကျပန္ၿပီ။ ဒီတစ္ႀကိမ္မွာေတာ့ စစ္တပ္ႀကီးေတြနဲ႔မဟုတ္ပဲ အစၥလာမ္ ေတြ မ်ဳိးပြားနယ္ခ်ဲ႕ဖို႔ေရးထားတဲ့ Al - Hijra ဆိုတဲ့ စာတမ္းရဲ့ ညႊန္ၾကားမွဳနဲ႔ျဖစ္တယ္။ ဒီစာတမ္းဟာ မိုဟာမက္ရဲ့ မကာ ကေန မဒီနာကို ေအာင္ႏိုင္ ခဲ့တာကို အေျခခံေရးထားတာျဖစ္တယ္။ လစ္ဗ်ားေခါင္းေဆာင္္ ကဒါဖီက ငါတို႔မြတ္ဆလင္ သန္း ၅၀ ဥေရာပမွာ ေနထိုင္ေနၾကတယ္ ဒါဟာ အလႅာရဲ့ အမိန္႔ေတာ္ အရ ဓား ၊ ေသနတ္ေတြ မသံုးပဲ ဥေရာပကို ေအာင္ႏိုင္ျခင္းပဲ ျဖစ္တယ္။
သန္း ၅၀ မြတ္ဆလင္ေတြက ႏွစ္အနည္းငယ္အတြင္း ဥေရာပကို မြတ္ဆလင္ေတြရဲ့ ကုန္းေျမအျဖစ္ ေျပာင္းလဲပစ္ ႏိုင္တယ္။ ပထမဆံုး အႀကိမ္အေနနဲ႔ မြတ္ဆလင္ အေျမာက္အမ်ားဟာ မြတ္ဆလင္ကမၻာကေန အျပင္ထြက္ၿပီးေနထိုင္ၾကတယ္။ ၿပီးေတာ့ အေနာက္ႏိုင္ငံေတြကို ျပႆ နာႀကီးေတြ လုပ္ေန ၾကတယ္။ Al - Hijra စာတမ္းဟာ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔သိထားတဲ့ အေနာက္ တိုင္း ယဥ္ေက်းမွဳကို အၿပီးတိုင္ေခ်မွဳန္းပစ္လိမ့္မယ္။ ကၽြန္ေတာ့္ႏိုင္ငံ ေဟာ္လန္ဟာ အစၥလာမၼစ္ ေဟာ္လန္ႏိုင္ငံ ျဖစ္ေနၿပီး ဥေရာပဆိုရင္လည္း အစၥလာမၼစ္ ဥေရာပျဖစ္ေနၿပီ။ ဥပမာအေနနဲ႔ေျပာရရင္ 12% မြတ္ဆလင္ေတြကသာ ဂ်ာမာန္ေတြကို ေနရာေပးတယ္။ ခရစ္ယာန္ ဘုရားေက်ာင္းေတြမွာ လူမရွိေတာ့ဘူး။ ဒါေပမယ့္ ဗလီေတြကေတာ့ မွဳိ ေတြေပါက္သလို ေပါမ်ား လာတယ္။ အေရွ႕အလယ္ပိုင္းက အလယ္ေခတ္ ယဥ္ေက်းမွဳေတြ ဘူးခါး ဝတ္တာေတြ ၊ ဘုရားသခင္အတြက္ သတ္ျဖတ္တာေတြ၊ မိန္းမအဂါၤကို ျဖတ္တာေတြ ဥေရာပမွာ ေခတ္စားလာၿပီ။ ရွီးယား က်မ္းစာ ၊ ရွီးယား ေမာဂိတ္ ၊ ရွီးယား စာသင္ေက်ာင္း ၊ ရွီးယား ဘဏ္ ၊ ရွီးယား တရားရုံး ၊ ရွီးယား ဘာဘီ အရုပ္ေတြ ဥေရာပမွာ အကုန္ေရာက္လာၿပီ။ ဒိန္းမတ္ ကိုပင္ေဟဂင္မွာ ျဖစ္တဲ့ျပစ္မွဳဳ 70% ေက်ာ္ မြတ္ဆလင္ေတြ က်ဴးလြန္ေနၾကတယ္။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ဆီကို ထရုိဂ်န္ျမင္းႀကီး က်ဴးေက်ာ္ဝင္ေရာက္ ေနၿပီ။ ဥပမာအေနနဲ႔ေျပာရရင္ အေမရိကန္ကို အစၥလာမ္ဘာသာ လႊမ္းမိုးေရးကို ဘယ္လိုလုပ္သလဲဆိုရင္ မင္နဲပိုလစ္ ေလဆိပ္ မွာ မြတ္ဆလင္ တကၠစီ ေမာင္းသမားက ခရီးသည္ ၅၀၀၀ ေက်ာ္ကို အရက္ပုလင္းပါလို႔ဆိုၿပီး ပို႔ေဆာင္ေပးဖို႔ ျငင္းဆန္ ခဲ့တယ္။ မြတ္ဆလင္ေက်ာင္းသားေတြက သူတို႔အတြက္ သီးျခား အေဆာင္ထားေပးရမယ္လို႔ ေတာင္းဆိုေနၾကတယ္။

 မြတ္ဆလင္ အမ်ဳိးသမီးေတြက ကာယ ေလ့က်င့္ဖို႔နဲ႔ ေရကူး ကန္ေတြမွာလည္း သီးျခား အခ်ိန္ပိုင္း ထားေပးရမယ္လို႔ ေတာင္းဆိုေနၾကတယ္။ ေက်ာင္းေတြမွာလည္း ေဟာလိုးဝဲန္းနဲ႔ ခရစၥမတ္ပြဲေတြကို မက်င္းပရဘူးတဲ့။ ေက်ာင္းက ေကာ္ဖီဆိုင္ မီႏူးေတြမွာလည္း ဝက္သားကို မထည့္ရဘူးတဲ့။ လူႀကီးမင္းမ်ားခင္ဗ်ား ဒါဟာ အစပဲရွိေသးတယ္ဆိုတာကို သတိထားၾကပါ။ ဒီလိုသာခြင့္ျပဳ လိုက္မယ္ဆိုရင္ အခုဥေရာ ပမွာ ရင္ဆိုင္ေနရသလိုပဲ ခင္ဗ်ားတို႔ အေမရိကန္မွာလည္း တစ္ပံုစံထဲ ရင္ဆိုင္ရပါလိမ့္မယ္။ အစၥလာမ္ လႊမ္းမိုးေရး ဝါဒကို ရပ္တန္႔ေအာင္မလုပ္ဘူးဆိုရင္ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ဟာ အရာရာ ဆံုးရွုံးမွဳ ေတြနဲ႔ ရင္ဆိုင္ရမွာျဖစ္ ပါတယ္။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ရဲ့ မ်ဳိးရုိး ၊ ယဥ္ေက်းမွဳ ၊ ဒီမိုကေရစီႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ၊ လြတ္လပ္ခြင့္နဲ႔ လူမွဳ အသိုင္းအဝိုင္းေတြ ဆံုးရွုံးမွဳနဲ႔ ရင္ဆိုင္ရ ပါလိမ့္မယ္။ ဥေရာပမွာ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ဟာ အစၥလာမ္ဘာသာကို လြတ္ လပ္စြာ ေဝဖန္ခြင့္ ေျပာဆိုခြင့္ေတြ ဆံုးရွုံးခဲ့ရၿပီးျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ လူႀကီးမင္းမ်ားခင္ဗ်ား အစၥေရးႏိုင္ငံဟာ စတင္တည္ေထာင္ စဥ္ကပင္ ဂ်ီဟတ္ အုပ္စုေတြရဲ့ တိုက္ခိုက္ျခင္းကို ခံေနခဲ့ရတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္ အစၥေရးကိုခ်စ္ပါတယ္။ ဥေရာပမွာေတာ့ ခင္ဗ်ား ဟာ အစၥေရးကို ေထာက္ခံမိရင္ အႏၱရာယ္နဲ႔ ရင္ဆိုင္ရပါ လိမ့္မယ္။ ေမွာင္မိုက္အတိၿပီးတဲ့ အေရွ႕အလယ္ပိုင္းမွာ အစၥေရးဟာ မီးျပတိုက္ တစ္ခုျဖစ္တယ္။ အစၥေရးဟာ အေနာက္ႏိုင္ငံေတြရဲ့ ဒီမိုကေရစီ ျပယုဒ္ ျဖစ္တယ္။ အေရးႀကီးတဲ့ အခ်က္တစ္ခု ေျပာပါရေစ အေရွ႕အလယ္ပိုင္း အက်ပ္အတည္းလို႔ ေျပာေနၾကတဲ့အရာဟာ တကယ္ေတာ့ အက်ပ္အတည္း မဟုတ္ပါဘူး။ အၾကမ္းဖက္မွဳ အက်ပ္အတည္းသာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဘာသာဝါဒ ျပႆ နာသာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ အစၥလာမ္နဲ႔ လြတ္လပ္ျခင္းရဲ့ၾကားကတိုက္ပြဲသာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဂါဇာ ေဂ်ာ္ဒန္နဲ႔ စမားရီးယားတို႔ရဲ့ နယ္ေျမျပႆ နာမဟုတ္ ပါဘူး။ ဒါဟာ ဂ်ီဟတ္စစ္ပြဲ သက္သက္သာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။
 တဲအဗီးနဲ႔ ဟိုင္းဖေတြရဲ့ အေျခခ် ေနထိုင္မွဳ ျပႆ နာသာျဖစ္ ပါတယ္။ အစၥလာမ္ဘာသာကအစၥေရးကိုတိုက္ခိုက္ဖို႔ဆြေပးေနတယ္။ အစၥေရးဟာ သူ႔ႏိုင္ငံ တစ္ခုတည္းကို ကာကြယ္ဖို႔အတြက္ တိုက္ခိုက္ေနတာ မဟုတ္ပါဘူး။ အစၥေရးဟာ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ နဲ႔အတူ ရွိေနပါတယ္။ အစၥေရးဟာ အေနာက္ႏိုင္ငံေတြအ တြက္ပါ တိုက္ေနတာသာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။

၁၉၄၃ ခုႏွစ္က စစ္စလီမွာ တိုက္ခဲ့တဲ့ ရဲရင့္တဲ့ အေမရိကန္ စစ္သားေတြလိုပဲ၊ ၁၉၄၄ မွာ ေနာ္မာန္ဒီ ကမ္းေျခမွာ တိုက္ခဲ့ တဲ့ မဟာမိတ္စစ္သားေတြလိုပဲ ၊ အစၥေရး စစ္သားေတြနဲ႔ စစ္သမီးေတြဟာ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ရဲ့ လြတ္လပ္ခြင့္ ၊ လူမွဳ အေဆာက္အဦးေတြအတြက္ တိုက္ခိုက္ေနၾကတာျဖစ္ ပါတယ္။ ေရေပၚဆီ လူတန္းစားေတြက ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ရဲ့ လူမွဳ အသိုင္း အဝိုင္းကို အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေနၾကပါတယ္။ နာမည္ခံ ေခါင္းေဆာင္ဆိုသူေတြဟာ ဒီမိစာၦဝါဒႀကီး မိစာၦ အယူအဆႀကီးကို သက္တမ္းရွည္ေအာင္ ယဥ္ေက်းမွဳ ေတြ အားလံုးဟာ အတူတူပဲလို႔ သတ္မွတ္ခဲ့ၾကတယ္။ အစိုးရပိုင္းပုဂၢိဳ လ္ေတြ တရားသူႀကီးေတြ ဘုရားေက်ာင္းေတြ ကုန္စည္ဒိုင္ေတြ တကၠသိုလ္ေတြ မီဒီယာေတြဟာ မ်က္စိ ကန္းေနၾကၿပီး ႏိုင္ငံေရး အမွန္တရားအျဖစ္ လက္ခံၿပီး အစၥလာမ္ဘာသာဘက္က ရပ္တည္ခဲ့ၾကတယ္။ လူႀကီးမင္းမ်ားကို ကၽြန္ေတာ္ေျပာပါရေစ ယဥ္ေက်းမွဳေတြ အားလံုးဟာ မတူညီၾကပါဘူး ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ရဲ့ ယဥ္ေက်းမွဳ ဟာ ခရစ္ယာန္ ဂ်ဴ းဝါဒ လူသားဝါဒေပၚမွာ အေျခခံထားၿပီး အစၥလာမ္ဘာသာထက္ အမ်ားႀကီးေကာင္းမြန္ပါတယ္။ ႏိုင္ငံေရးသမားေတြက ဒီမိုကေရစီနဲ႔ လြတ္လပ္ခြင့္ကိုကာ ကြယ္တာဟာ သူတို႔အလုပ္မဟုတ္ဘူးလို႔ ထင္ေနၾကတယ္။
ရွီးယား ဥပေဒကို ေလ်ာေလ်ာရူရူ လက္ခံလာဖို႔ေလာက္သာ သူတို႔လုပ္ခ်င္ၾကတယ္။

လူႀကီးမင္းမ်ားခင္ဗ်ား ျပႆ နာကိုသိေနမွေတာ့ ခင္ဗ်ားမွာ အေျဖမရွိဘူးလားလို႔ ကၽြန္ေတာ္ မၾကာခဏ အေမးခံရပါ တယ္။ ေကာင္းပါၿပီ ကၽြန္ေတာ့္မွာ တိက်တဲ့ အေျဖေတြရွိ ပါတယ္။ ဥေရာပက ေရေပၚဆီ ႏိုင္ငံေရးသမားေတြကေတာ့ကၽြန္ေတာ့္ အေျဖကို ႀကိဳက္ၾကမယ္ မထင္ပါဘူး။ ကၽြန္ေတာ့္အခ်ဳိ႕ အေျဖေတြကို ရွင္းျပပါရေစ ။
 အစၥလာမ္ ဘာသာနယ္ခ်ဲ႕မွဳေတြကို ကာကြယ္ရမယ့္အခ်က္ေတြပါ။ အေနာက္ႏိုင္ငံေတြကိုအစၥလာမ္ဇာတ္သြင္းေနတဲ့အ ေၾကာင္းေတြပါ။ နံပါတ္တစ္က ယဥ္ေက်းမွဳ ဝါးမ်ဳိျခင္းကို ရပ္တန္႔ရပါမယ္။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္ယံုၾကည္ေနတာ တစ္ခုရွိတယ္။ ဒါကေတာ့ ဖြဲ႔စည္းအုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ပံု အေျခခံ ဥပေဒမွာ ပုဒ္မတစ္ခု ထည့္သင့္ပါတယ္ ၊ ဒါကေတာ့ ဂ်ဴ း ခရစ္ယာန္နဲ႔ လူသားဝါဒ ယဥ္ေက်းမွဳကို ကာကြယ္တဲ့ ဥပေဒပါ။ နံပါတ္ႏွစ္က အစၥလာမ္ဆိုတာ ဘာသာတရားပါလို႔ ဟန္ ေဆာင္ေနျခင္းကို ရပ္တန္႔ရပါမယ္။ အစၥလာမ္ဆိုတာ ဘာသာ တရားမဟုတ္ပါဘူး ။ အစၥလာမ္ဆိုတာ အာဏာရွင္ ဝါဒမွိဳင္း တစ္ခုသာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဘာသာေရး လြတ္လပ္ခြင့္ဆိုတဲ့ စကားလံုးဟာ အစၥလာမ္ ဘာသာနဲ႔ မိုက္တန္ပါဘူး။ ဒါေၾကာင့္ အစၥလာမ္ဘာသာကို အျခားဘာသာတရားေတြ ျဖစ္တဲ့ ဂ်ဴ းဘာသာ ခရစ္ယာန္ ဗုဒၶဘာသာေတြနဲ႔ မႏွိဳင္းယွဥ္ သင့္ပါဘူး။ အျခားအာဏာရွင္ဝါဒေတြျဖစ္တဲ့ ကြန္ျမဴ နစ္စနစ္ ၊ ဖက္ဆစ္ စနစ္ေတြနဲ႔သာ ႏွိဳင္းယွဥ္သင့္ပါတယ္။ လူႀကီးမင္းမ်ားလုပ္ေဆာင္ဖို႔ အေရးႀကီးတဲ့အခ်က္က ကၽြန္ ေတာ္ပါလီမာန္မွာ အၿမဲေျပာတာရွိပါတယ္။ ဒါကေတာ့ မြတ္ဆလင္ႏိုင္ငံေတြကေန လူေတြ အစုလိုက္ အၿပံဳ လိုက္ ေျပာင္းေရႊ႕လာျခင္းကို ရပ္တန္႔ဖို႔ပဲျဖစ္ပါတယ္။
 ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ရဲ့ မူလတန္ဖိုး မ်ဳိးရုိး ၊ ယဥ္ေက်းမွဳေတြကို ထိမ္း သိမ္းဖို႔ဆိုရင္ေနာက္ထပ္မြတ္ဆလင္ တစ္ေယာက္ကိုေတာင္ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ လူ႔အသိုင္းအဝိုင္းအတြင္းမွာ လက္မခံသင့္ ပါဘူး။ မြတ္ဆလင္စိတ္ဓာတ္ ျပင္းထန္လြန္းသူေတြကိုေတာ့ ကၽြန္ ေတာ္တို႔အေနနဲ႔ သဟဇာတျဖစ္ေအာင္ ေနဖို႔မလိုပါဘူး။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔တန္ဘိုးေတြနဲ႔ လူ႕အဖြဲ႔အစည္းကို တန္ဘိုးထား သူေတြကိုေတာ့ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ဆီမွာ အမုန္းတရားေတြမကိန္း ေအာင္းခင္ကပဲ တန္းတူညီမွ် ေနထိုင္ဖို႔အတြက္ ႀကိဳဆိုခဲ့ ပါတယ္။ ဒါေပမယ့္ မၾကာခင္မွာပဲ ဂ်ီဟတ္လုပ္ဖို႔ ရွီးယားဥပေဒကို အသက္သြင္းဖို႔အႀကံအစည္ေတြရွိရင္ေတာ့ ေဟာဒီမွာတံခါးမင္းတို႔ထြက္သြားလို႔ ေမာင္းထုတ္ရမွာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။
 လက္ရွိေနထိုင္ေနတဲ့ အေနာက္ႏိုင္ငံသားမဟုတ္သူ လူနည္း စုေတြကို အံဝင္ခြင္က်ျဖစ္ေအာင္ ေနထိုင္ေရးနဲ႔ သစၥာခံျခင္း အာမခံခ်က္ေတြကို ဥပေဒအရ လက္မွတ္ထိုးခိုင္းရမယ္လို႔ ကၽြန္ေတာ္ ယံုၾကည္ပါတယ္။ လူႀကီးမင္းမ်ားခင္ဗ်ား ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔အေနနဲ႔ ဗလီအသစ္ေတြ ေဆာက္လုပ္တာကို ရပ္တန္႔ရပါမယ္။
 ေဆာ္ဒီမွာ ခရစ္ယာန္ ဘုရားေက်ာင္းေတြ ေဆာက္လုပ္ခြင့္ မျပဳ သလိုမ်ဳိး ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ ႏိုင္ငံေတြမွာ ဗလီေဆာက္ဖို႔အ တြက္ အုတ္တစ္ခ်ပ္ေတာင္ လက္မခံ သင့္ပါဘူး။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ လူ႔အသိုင္းအဝိုင္းမွာ ဆိုးရြားတဲ့ အစၥလာမ္ အေလ့အက်င့္ေတြကို ပိတ္ပင္ တားျမစ္ရပါမယ္။ အစၥလာမ္ေက်ာင္းေတြက သင္ေနတဲ့ ဖက္ဆစ္စနစ္ အေလ့ အက်င့္မ်ဳိးေတြကိုပါ။
 လူငယ္ေတြကို အစၥလာမ္ေက်ာင္းေတြမွာ လူစုၿပီး ဝါဒမွိဳင္း တိုက္ေနတာေတြ အၾကမ္းဖက္ စိတ္ဓာတ္ေတြ သင္ၾကားေန ျခင္းေၾကာင့္ အစၥလာမ္ ေက်ာင္းေတြကို ပိတ္ပစ္ရပါမယ္။ ေနာက္ဆံုး ဥပမာအေနနဲ႔ အေရးအႀကီးဆံုးေတြထဲက တစ္ခု လည္းျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဒါကေတာ့ ေခါင္းေဆာင္မွဳ အားနည္းတဲ့သူေတြကို ဖယ္ထုတ္ ပစ္ရပါမယ္။
 အတုိခ်ဳပ္ေျပာရမယ္ဆိုရင္ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔အေနနဲ႔ အရင္ကလို ဘာသာေရးစစ္ပြဲေတြ ျပန္ၿပီးဆင္ႏႊဲရပါလိမ့္မယ္။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ ထိုင္ေနလို႔ မျဖစ္ေတာ့ဘူး ၊ ထၾကြလံုးလ ရွိရ ပါလိမ့္မယ္။ သူတို႔က ရွီးယားဥပေဒအရ ဗံုးခြဲတိုက္ခိုက္ရင္ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးအတြက္ သူတို႔ကိုျပန္ၿပီး ဗံုးခြဲတိုက္ခိုက္ရပါလိမ့္ မယ္။ သူတုိ႔ကညင္ညင္သာသာ တိုက္ခိုက္လာရင္ ကၽြန္ေတာ္ တို႔အေနနဲ႔လည္း ညင္ညင္သာသာ ျပန္လည္ တိုက္ခိုက္ဖို႔ လိုပါတယ္။ သူတို႔ကို လက္တံု႔ျပန္ၿပီး လူသန္းေပါင္းမ်ားစြာဟာ လံုးဝ နာက်ည္းမုန္းတီးေနတယ္ဆိုတာကို ျပသရပါမယ္။
 သန္းေပါင္းမ်ားစြာ လြတ္လပ္ျခင္းကို ခ်စ္ျမတ္ႏိုးသူေတြမွာ သီးခံႏိုင္စြမ္း မရွိေတာ့ဘူးဆိုတာကို ရွင္းရွင္းလင္းလင္း ေျပာ ျပရပါလိမ့္မယ္။ မႏွစ္က ဒီလိုဆန္႔က်င္ေျပာခဲ့လို႔ ကၽြန္ေတာ့္ႏိုင္ငံကို စီးပြားေရး သပိတ္ေမွာက္မယ္လို႔ ၿခိမ္းေျခာက္ခံခဲ့ရပါတယ္။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ရဲ့ လွပတဲ့အလံကိုလည္း အေရွ႕အလယ္ပိုင္း ႏိုင္ငံေတြမွာ မီးရွုီ႕ခဲ့ၾကတယ္။ လူႀကီးမင္းမ်ားခင္ဗ်ား ကၽြန္ေတာ့္ကို ကၽြန္ေတာ့္တိုင္းျပည္ အစိုးရကေတာင္ ျပန္ၿပီးတရားစြဲပါတယ္။ ျပင္သစ္နဲ႔ ေဂ်ာ္ဒန္ႏိုင္ငံကလည္း တရားစြဲဖို႔ ျပင္ဆင္ေနၾကတယ္။ အဂၤလန္နဲ႔ အင္ဒိုနီးရွားကေတာ့ ကၽြန္ေတာ့္ကို ျပည္ဝင္ခြင့္ပိတ္ ပင္ထားပါတယ္။ နယ္သာလန္က အစြန္းေရာက္ ဗလီဆရာေတြက ကၽြန္ေတာ့္ကို တရားစြဲဖို႔ ေတာင္းဆိုေနၾကပါတယ္။ နယ္သာလန္ ပါလီမာန္မွာ အစၥလာမ္ဘာသာကို ေဝဖန္တာကို တားဆီးကာကြယ္ဖို႔ ဥပေဒၾကမ္းေတာင္ ေရးဆြဲၿပီးေနပါၿပီ။ အယ္ေကးဒါးက ကၽြန္ေတာ့္ရဲ့ အစၥလာမ္အေပၚ မေကာင္းျမင္မွဳ ေၾကာင့္ ကၽြန္ေတာ့္ကို သတ္ဖို႔ ဆံုးျဖတ္ထားၾကတယ္။
 ေနာက္ဆံုးအေနနဲ႔ လူႀကီးမင္းမ်ားခင္ဗ်ား ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ ဥေရာပ တိုက္ႀကီး နာဇီလက္က လြတ္ေျမာက္ဖို႔အတြက္ တိုက္ခဲ့ၾကတဲ့ စစ္သားေတြကို ေမ့ထားလို႔ မရပါဘူး။
 ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ရဲ့ လြတ္ ေျမာက္ေရးတိုက္ပြဲဟာ အလြန္ပဲခါးသီးခဲ့ပါတယ္။ အေမရိကန္စစ္သားေတြ အသက္ေသြးေတြေပးဆပ္ၿပီး တိုက္ခဲ့ ၾကတာဟာ ဥေရာပတိုက္ လြတ္ေျမာက္ဖို႔ျဖစ္ၿပီး ၊ အေမရိကန္ စစ္သားေတြဟာ ဥေရာပတိုက္ႀကီး အစၥလာမ္ဘာသာ လႊမ္းမိုး ေရးအတြက္ တိုက္ခဲ့ၾကတာမဟုတ္ပါဘူး။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ဟာ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ရဲ့ ခြန္အား ၊ မ်ဳိးရုိး ၊ ယဥ္ေက်းမွဳ ၊ ဒီမိုကေရစီ အေဆာက္အဦး လြတ္လပ္ခြင့္ ၊ လူမွဳ အသိုင္းအဝိုင္း ေတြအားလံုးအတြက္ ကာကြယ္ရပါမယ္။ ဒီလိုမွမဟုတ္ရင္ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔မ်ဳိးဆက္ေတြဟာ သူတို႔ရဲ့မ်ဳိးဆက္ ေတြအတြက္ အေၾကြးတင္ေနပါလိမ့္မယ္။
ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ ဘယ္ေတာ့မွ အညံ့ခံမွာ မဟုတ္ဘူး ၊ အရွုံးေပးမွာ မဟုတ္ဘူး ၊ လက္နက္ခ်မွာမဟုတ္ဘူး ၊ ေက်းဇူးအမ်ားႀကီးတင္ပါတယ္။
ဘာသာျပန္ဆိုသူ - Ye Thurein Min

Tanks Store Terminals(ဓါတ္ပံု)

Tanks Store Terminals

 အသစ္ထပ္ခ်ဲ႔ေနတဲ့

ဓါတ္ပံု ပညာစုေဆာင္းထား သမွ် Link ေလးေတြ

http://shlaing.blogspot.com/... (ဆရာစိုးလႈိင္ရဲ႕ Blog ပါ) ,

 http://blog.aperture21.com/category/photography-tutorial/long-exposure/ (ဆရာ Black Dream ရဲ႕ Blog ပါ), 

http://myanmarlensman.com/blogs/entry/Camera-Photographer (Myanmar Lens Men Photography Blog ပါ) 

, http://www.facebookcollection.org/ဓာတ္ပံု-အေၾကာင္း-ေထြရာ-ေလးပါး.html (Facebook Page ေလးေတြပါ) , 

https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=503740649661288&story_fbid=529524673749552  (ေကာင္းႏုိးရာရာ Link မ်ား), 

http://www.datponsaya.com/2013/06/557 (ဓါတ္ပံု ဆရာ ေဒါ့ကြန္းပါ) ,

 http://narlalthamya.blogspot.com/2012/11/dslr-camer.html (Photography Blog တစ္ခုပါ) , 

https://www.facebook.com/notes/pye-aye-nyein/bokeh-aperture-depth-of-field-creating-own-bokeh/10152882292095357 , https://www.facebook.com/notes/linn-soe-hlaing/ကိုယ္ပိုင္-dslr-ကင္မရာေတြအတြက္-ဘယ္လို-lens-ေတြ-ေရႊးခ်ယ္ဝယ္ယူၾကမလဲ/10151311628987089 (ဗဟုသုတ ရဖြယ္ရာမ်ား) , 

https://www.facebook.com/notes/harry-lee-photography/hunting-the-milky-way/586179704727685 (Milky Way ရွာေဖြျပီၚ ရုိက္ၾကမယ္) ,

 http://www.pixel-peeper.com/ (ကင္မရာ မ်ဳိးစံု နဲ႕ ရုိက္ထားသမွ်ေတြပါ) ,

 https://www.facebook.com/notes/aperture21-lives-beyond-the-light/ဘယ္-mode-နဲ႕-ရိုက္ရမလဲ/468287053231471 (ဘယ္ Mode နဲ႔ ရုိက္ၾကမလဲ) ,

https://www.facebook.com/notes/ဓါတ္ပံု၀ါသနာရွင္မ်ားအသင္း/ဓါတ္ပံုကဗ်ာdslrကင္မရာေတြအတြက္/347048382032253 (ဓါတ္ပံု ကဗ်ာ),

 https://www.facebook.com/notes/aperture21-lives-beyond-the-light/white-balance-ဆိုတာဘာလဲ/405472009512976 (White Balance ဘယ္လို ထိမ္းမလဲ ),

 http://www.dslrtips.com/lens_guide/Lens_buying_guide.shtml , Lightroom အေျခခံအသံုးျပဳနည္း (၃) 

https://www.facebook.com/notes/aperture21-lives-beyond-the-light/lightroom-အေျခခံအသံုးျပဳနည္း-၃/476042039122639,

ဓါတ္ပံု ပညာကို က်ားကုပ္က်ားခဲ ေလ့လာေနၾကေသာ ညီအစ္ကို ေတြအားလံုးကို ရည္ရြယ္ပါတယ္ ခင္ဗ်ာ.... ဘယ္ကေနစ ရမွန္းမသိေသးတဲ့ မန္ဘာ အသစ္ သူငယ္ခ်င္းေတြ အတြက္ အဓိက ေပါ့.... က်ေနာ္တို႔လဲ ဒီ Group ( MPKE) နဲ႔ မေတြ႕ရခင္မွာ ေတာ္ေတာ္ ရြာလည္ခဲ့ပါတယ္.... က်ေနာ့္လို မျဖစ္ရေအာင္ သိေစခ်င္ ဖတ္ေစခ်င္တဲ့ ေစတနာ သက္သက္ပါ.... အျခား မည္သည့္ စိတ္ထားမ်ဳိးမွ် မပါဝင္ပါေၾကာင္း...... အားလံုးကို ေလးစားစြာ ျဖင့္ စုေဆာင္းထား သမွ် Link ေလးေတြကို ရွယ္ေပးလိုက္ပါတယ္....

အားလံုး ေအာင္ျမင္တဲ့ ျမန္မာ့ အလွေတြကို ကမၻာသိေအာင္ ေဖာ္ထုတ္ႏုိင္တဲ့ ဓါတ္ပံုဆရာေတြ ျဖစ္ၾကပါေစဗ်ာ.....

ေလးစားစြာျဖင့္...........

ထူးေဝ........

 

VDR real time Monitor (Voyage Data Recorder ) ကိုupdate လုပ္လိုက္ၿပီ

VDR real time Monitor 

 VDR (Voyage Data Recorder ) ကိုupdate လုပ္လိုက္တာပါ

သူၾကီးအခန္းကေနၿပီးHD နဲ႔ထပ္Recording လုပ္သလို AIS,Radar,VDRတို႔ကိုlive monitoring လုပ္ၿပီး

ၾကည့္နိဳင္နားေထာင္နိဳင္တယ္

ပါ၀င္တာေတြက

CPU set HDကၿဖဳတ္ၿပီးရံုးပို႔နိဳင္spare +1

CPUထဲ့ကhdကိုsystem runningပဲသံုး

 monitor,keyboard,mouse

 HD ကrecording ကိုလည္းနွစ္လထိဖမ္းနိဳင္သလိုလိုအပ္ယင္ရုံးကိုၿဖဳတ္ေပးနိဳင္ေအာင္အပိုHD ကိုလည္းေပးထားတယ္

 ပံုမွာRun Backup ကအသံrecording

recording အနီေလးလိုနွိပ္လွ်င္ေအာက္ကRecording ပံုၿမင္ရမယ္

HD ကိုၿဖဳတ္ခ်င္ယင္ stop ၿပီး ၾကက္ေၿခခတ္ကိုနွိပ္ၿပီးမွHDကိုၿဖဳတ္ပါ 

Live Player Pro3.2 ကေၿပာေနတာေတြliveနားေထာင္နိဳင္သလို၊
AIS,Radar view ေတြၾကည့္နိဳင္တယ္

ၿမွားေတြနဲ႔ၿပထာတယ္

 tools windows ေအာက္က connect ကိုအယင္လုပ္၊ ၿပီးPlay ၊stop ၊pause ေတြနဲ႔အသံနာေထာင္

 

AIS,Radar 1&2 view ေတြၾကည့္နိဳင္တယ္

ေၿပာဆိုတာေတြကိုပီသစြားၾကားရတာမို႔သၾကီးသိနိဳင္သလိုရံုးကလတိုင္းHDကိုေအာက္ခ်ေပးရမယ္ဆို

အလြယ္တကူသိနိဳင္ပါတယ္။မူရင္းHDမွာကတစ္လေလာက္အထိပဲ့recordingလုပ္ၿပီးအေဟာင္းေတြကို

Over writeလုပ္သြားတာပါ

Supertanker Dimension

Oil Major Inspection Observation for the month of July 2014 to September 2014.

Oil Major Inspection Observation for the month of July 2014 to September 2014.

 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

 1;   Fire hose used to check the pressure of emergency fire pump was slightly leaking.

2;    Wilden pump was provided to deal with small oil spill on main deck port and starboard but discharge hoses were not connected to any drain tank/container.

  3;  Viewing glass for deck water seal and P/V breaker were dirty and not clear.

4;    Both port and starboard manifolds were full of oily/water mixture.

5;    Flange of port bunker manifold (MGO) was leaking in drops. Same rectified on spot.

6;    There was water accumulation at port and starboard side in forecastle store.

 7;   No evidence was found for the inspecting bridge navigational gears/ equipments, prior to departure last anchorage or pre arrival at terminal.

8;    Ships drawing/ plans were not found in ‘SMPEP’ manual.

9;    “CCR” cargo tanks audible alarm system was notice being intent allay disconnected from the main. Cargo tanks P/V system individual valves were not positively secured, against accidental operating.

10;    Ballast tanks sampling/ inspecting procedure was not followed, prior to de-ballasting at terminal. Section code “R” for SSSCL was not completed.

11;    ECR 415 volts feeder panel was showing low insulation of <3.0 M Ω. Duty personal was observed without safety helmet and safety ear muff.

12;    In ORB Part 1, Code 'H', item 26.3, was used for Lube oil bunkers.

13;    The 'quick closing valves' panel air reservoir pressure was set at 5 kg/cm2, less than recommended of 7 kg/cm2 as per instructions posted.

14;    Rescue / safety harness was provided at location for lifting an incapacitated person from bow thruster compartment and engine room emergency escape trunk but donning instructions were not available. Also, the rescue arrangement to bow thruster compartment i.e safety line and block was not rigged for immediate use.

 15;   Vessel last bunkered marine gas oil on 16 June 2014 at Noumea, New Caledonia but MSDS was not available.

16;    At time of inspection, the sight glass of the P/V breaker was internally coated with black residue and water level was not visible.

17;    The lead of the pick up rope from the stopper was via a pedestal roller to mooring winch. 18;The lead from the pedestal roller took a 90 degree turn to the mooring winch tension drum; the tension drum was not of sufficient size to accommodate 150 meters of 80 mm diameter rope. Vessel was fitted with hydraulic driven split type mooring winches.

19;    There was no certificate on board to establish that vessel's boiler was not specifically designed or modified for the use low sulpur distillate fuels nor was an alternative method of heating provided.

20;    The officers' matrix posted for the vessel on the SIRE website did not accurately reflect the information relating to the officers on board at the time of the inspection. The chief officer had a Class 1 certificate, but the matrix shown that he had only a Class 2 certificate.

 21;   Observed two different type of SARTs provided on board, noted one was of different type from ship-specific lifesaving equipment training manual.

22;    Fixed fire detection and alarm system was on manual mode.

23;    5 yearly test record of bow chain stopper was not available on board at the time.

24;    Observed two aft mooring tails were heavily stained and dark.

25;    Observed C deck door was corroded and wasted from bottom.

 26;   Hand rails were not fitted for getting onto embarkation ladders when rigged for port & starboard life boat/rafts.

 27;   Planned Maintenance System onboard does not contain job description to carry out 'Performance Test' of auxiliary engines. (Monthly performance tests of auxiliary engines were carried out at 430 kW while engines were rated 750 kW.)

28;    The rudder angle indicator located outside wheelhouse on starboard bridge wing was found with moisture adhered on the glass surface inside.

  29;  The erected fire curtain was  not provided or fitted in engine room workshop (The engine room workshop was not completely enclosed)

30;    In Oil Record Book Part 1, all entries made from 19 Oct 2013 to 05 July 2014 were signed at the end of each entry by the chief engineer. However, as confirmed by the chief engineer, the actual responsible person who carried out the operation was the second engineer.

31;    The nuts fitted on storm valves for engine room port side sea chest were found heavily rusted.

32;    At time of inspection, vessel only had one portable instrument for measuring oxygen. The other analyzer was landed ashore on 01 July 2014 for shore servicing/calibration (sighted landing report).

  33;  The on board 'Ballast water and sediments management plan ' was not Class or Administration approved.

  34;  The cargo tanks were not inspected within last 30 months. Last inspected in December 2011.

  35;   The portable tank cleaning hoses were not tested for electrical continuity prior to each use. The on board practice was to test the electrical continuity of all portable tank cleaning hoses monthly.

36;     The port and starboard davits of the life raft emergency lights were seized in over side positions.

37;    The Master was in possession of an ECDIS Generic Training certificate of one day duration and there was also no objective evidence to indicate that the course addressed each of the topics contained in the IMO Model Course 1.27.

38;    The smoking policy as part of the SMS did not include restrictions for the use of 'E-cigarettes'

39;    It was observed that the poop deck steering room entrance door was not closed during cargo discharge operations.

40;    It was observed that lifejackets provided (2 sets) at pilot access position (starboard) were not provided lights.

41;    It was observed that fire detector panel in fire station on upper deck was displaying "Fault", when queried the ship's staff explained that this was due to battery fault (trouble code:163)

42;    A review of the cargo oil record book (Part II) indicated that oily water slop had been disposed on 27 March 2014 at Singapore; however the port and quantity of disposed were not recorded in the ORB Part II (Code.J-57.1).

 43;   It was observed that drain plug for spill container of diesel oil tank located on funnel deck was not in place.

44;    A review of the lube oil analysis records on file did not show any records of lube oil analysis being done for the emergency generator. Nor was there a requirements as part of the planned maintenance system or otherwise to have the lube oil replaced periodically.

45;    In sewage Pollution Prevention Certificate, Section 1.3, total capacity of the sewage holding tank was not provided.

46;    Cancelled Navtex, message was not removed from BA Chart 4041 in use.

47;    Exhaust stacks of the main engine (1.no.), boilers (2 nos.) and generators (3 nos.) on the funnel were in rusted condition.

48;    The stern light (upper position) was found out of order at the time of inspection. It was rectified when inspector pointed out.

49;    It was found that the spectacle flanges for the tank cleaning heater inlet and outlet pipe were not blanked at the time of cargo discharging.

50;    Three pieces of elbow (diameter 200 mm) nearby the boiler circulating pumps were not secured in the port side in generators platform. It was rectified when inspector pointed out.

51;    The cargo cross over vent (goose neck) for cargo line number 1,2 & 3 (located between port and starboard cargo manifold) was provided with valves however not capped or plugged.

52;    Morring wire MBL were 1223.75 KN as per certificates onboard however nylon mooring tails MBL as per certificates were 160 T

53;    Two units of mooring chocks at F'cle deck had deep grooving.

54;    (i) Though vessel certified / equipped for UMS operation engine room was being manned throughout but Minimum Safe Manning certificate was issued only for UMS vessel (Periodically Unattended Machinery Space). (ii) Vessel recently completed her first Special Survey but (ESP) condition Evaluation Report was not available onboard.

55;    Vessel fitted with one (1) ECDIS but Master not attended shore-based ECDIS training. (He had undergone CBT-based training by SEAGULL & certificate issued on 29 October 2009 & a 1 day hands-on ECDIS training on 4 May 2011.)

56;    In the CO2 bottles f/f system room, the extraction fan was mounted at top side (0.5 m from deck head) of the side bulkhead but was not fitted with trunk arrangement extending down to the deck (floor) to endure effective extraction of any CO2 (heavier) gas out of th space.

57;    Vessel was built in 2009 but noted at foc'sle deck, the pick-up hawser from SPM to the (port/starboard) winch stowage drums were via one pedestal roller each; not direct lead to winch drum.

58;    Bridge Team Management course certificate of Master and 3rd officer did not declared the duration of course of at least 3 days. The only thing was declared on their certificates was date of issue.

59;    There was no documented evidence found inside section 8 of VDR annual performance test report by approved technician dated 13 Mar 2014 that interface of BNWAS was checked. (For info: the vessel was constructed after 01 Jul 2011.)

60;    The expiry dates of cartridges of all three (3) line throwing apparatus could not verified as they were not marked.

61;    The operational accuracy periodic checks of damage stability assessment by means of class approved test conditions was not practiced by the ship's staff. (for info: The vessel had Class ABS approved damage stability program inside the computer.)

62;    The lifting equipment annual thorough examination Class ABS report dated 21 Feb 2014 declared the location of 3.0T provision crane incorrectly as port side, whereas as physical check showed it was located on starboard side.

63;    Deck duty personal was not fully conversant with ship and shore checklist section code for the cargo operation.

64;    Engine room pre-arrival check list was not properly filled. Witness was not sign/ authenticated by senior engine room personal.

65;    It was observed that vsl accommodation w/t doors were kept open during discharging operation; - upper deck (port & stbd) - A deck ( port side ) - B deck ( port side ) - Paint store - Upper deck (aft), entrance to Engine room. W/t was shut immediately after duty officer was informed.

66;    It was observed that vessel's crew member was using a mobile phone at B deck port side, outside of vessel accommodation stain way platform.

67;    Cargo pump room two flooding dampers were open at the time of the inspection. (Closed once being pointed out.)

68;    More than 15 pieces of rags were noted on the cargo stripping pump and main cargo pumps in the cargo pump room. These rags were clean and free of oil and were removed once being pointed out.

69;    The gauge glass self-closing valve for lube oil store tank in the engine room was bound open.(bind was removed once being pointed.)

70;    The date of attendance was not indicated in the Bridge Team Management and Bridge Resource Management certificates of the Master.

71;    The fore Peak Tank (SBT ) of the vessel was located below a Void Space which was served by two large manholes on the main deck and their covers were secured in place by many bolts and entry from the Void Space into the Fore peak Tank was also via two man holes located on the tank top of the Fore Peak Tank hence, the opening of the covers was not easily inspection/checking of the ballast in the Fore Peak Tank prior to de-ballasting. The Fore Peak Tank was fitted with a sounding pipe.

72;    The second officer (A) was in possession of Bridge Team Management (BTM) certificates; however there was no objective evidence to indicate that the course was of three (3) days duration.

73;    1. The Master had not completed a generic ECDIS training course. 2. The second officer (A) and chief officer were in possession of ECDIS Generic Training certificates; however, there was also no objective evidence to indicate that the durations of the course and the course addressed the topics contained in the IMO Model Course 1.27, respectively.

74;    During the testing of cargo tank overflow alarms, it was observed that the external sound function of overflow alarm on deck (which was located on top of the bridge) was not operational.

75;    The top and lower (spring loaded valve) level glass gauging closing devices of the fuel tank of emergency diesel generator were observed left open (i.e lashed by wires)

76;    A significant earth fault of 0.7 mega ohms was observed on the 440V switchboard of exhaust fan motor in bosun store.

77;    The Fore Peak Tank (SBT) of the vessel was located below a Void Space which was served by two deck hatches on the main deck and entry from the Void Space into the Fore Peak Tank was via two large manholes located on the tank top of the Fore Peak Tank and their covers were secured in place by many bolts hence, the inspection and checking of ballast in the Fore Peak Tank was not easily achieved prior to de-ballasting. The Fore Peak Tank was fitted with a sampling/sounding pipe.

78;    Limitations relating to the maximum permissible bollard pull (SWL 46.0 tons) from tugs that are to be utilized was stated in the pilot cards but tugs actual bollard pull was not completed in the Master and pilot information exchanges.

79;    Times and locations of engaging hand steering when navigating through restricted waters was not recorded in deck log book or bell book.

80;    The required markings were not marked at the top platform of both accommodation ladders.

81;    Testing of the cargo tanks remote temperature and pressure sensors was included in vessel's in-house computerized PMS but results were not recorded/available.

82;    Cargo pump room fixed gas monitoring system measured %LEL, oxygen and H2S. However, the local gas detectors fitted in the cargo pump room were not identified as to which gas they measured.

83;    The life boat Recovery Strops and Hanging-off pendants were not provided for the Rescue boat recovery in the Heavy weather to meet the amended SOLAS requirement.

84;    The expiry dates of cartridges of all four (4) line throwing apparatus could not be verified as they were not marked.

85;    The expected Under Keel Clearance value on the lowest astronomical tide and in the worst case of trim was not calculated and UKC limitations did not form a part of the cargo plan.

 86;   The first three (3) stud-links from port side anchor chain swivel had two (2) studs missing and one (1) studded link was deformed. Reportedly the repair job was on request since 08 Aug 2014.

87;    The insulation rating could not be verified of non-conducting mats provided around the electrical switchboards exceeding 220 volts inside the engine room open space.

88;    No alarms activated on the bridge VDR panel when GPS and Echo Sounder was switched off.

89;    The fixed foam system provided on board was protein based alcohol, however last analysis dated 01 Oct 2014 did not include stability test with Acetone.

90;    As per the hose handling instruction booklet, vessel need to carry 43 pieces of complete set of hydraulic hoses, however there were only 9 hoses available on board.

91;    It states that Master carries out training for navigation in ice however the Master have not attended any sort of ice training.

92;    Bridge main fire monitoring/ extinction panel was showing system faults.

93;    Fixed foam last test due before 12th July 2014. Senior personal reported vessel had landed samples and waits for the lab results.

 94;   Fwd and aft (2+2) mooring ropes visual condition were notice fair. (Repeated)

95;    Engine control room 220 volts feeder panel was showing low insulation of < 1.6 M Ω.

96;    Mooring ropes original certificates were not available on board.

97;    Max venting capability was not displayed in CCR.

98;    The copy of the operator's navigation policy and procedures on the bridge was not updated at the time of inspection. Rectified before inspector leave the vessel.

99;    The pump room telephone audible alarm was not working at the time of inspection.

100;    Manufactures' instruction for the maintenance of the gas sampling system was not incorporated in PMS and had not been followed by ship staff.

101;    The use of Fall Prevention Devices (FDPs) was not incorporated in the ship specific life saving equipment training manual. Rectified before inspector leave the vessel.

102;    The sighting glass of the observation tank located at main deck was not transparent. 103 ;    The surface of water in the observation tank could not be seen.

 104;   The method employed to ensure that the tanks were dry was not recorded in record of previous COW operation.

105;    The Hydro-Motor of winch no 2 located at port side on main deck was drop leaking at the time of inspection. A plastic bucket had been located under the hydro-motor of the winch.

 106;    The main boilers were not running on auto mode at the time of inspection.

107;     The class approved fire plan available externally onboard did not use IMO resolution A.645 (16) recommended symbol colour (all symbols were in yellow colour).

108;     The cargo cross over drain for cross line 1,2 & 3 located between port and starboard cargo manifold was provided with valve however not capped or plugged. The port & Starboard bunker lines manifold located at amidships and forward of accommodation, it drains were provided with valves however not capped or plugged.

109;    The vessel single point mooring arrangement required the use of three pedestal roller to lead the hawser at acute angle to the winch storage drum and exposed winch operator to risk of whiplash injury.

200;    Starboard side accommodation ladder was missing. It was reported to have been off-landed ashore for repairs.

201;    Discharge of slops had been entered under item 'C' rather than item 'J' in the Oil Record Book, part II on 16-May-2014.

202;    Remote atmospheric pressure indicator of 2p cargo tank was defective and showing pressure of 10 mb; whereas, the pressure in tank was 47 mb.

203;    One of the two SAT C communication unit was consistently showing poor reception quality of signals, though both units had been connected to the same ocean region satellite and antenna of both units were next to each other, about 1.5m apart, on top of main mast clear of and above all obstructions including funnel.

204;    Cargo pump room was fitted with one fan. Spare motor for the pump room extraction fan was not available.

 205;   One of the hydrocarbon sensors to fixed gas detection system for the pump room was defective and displaying alarm.

206;    Rollers to various multi fairleads were frozen at the time of inspection.

207;    Superstructure block sighted with scattered spot rusting, rust staining and weeping at portholes. Main engine (1 nos,) & power pack (2 nos,) exhaust stacks on funnel were in rusted condition. Power pack exhaust stack (1 nos,) was thinned and holed.

208;    Vessel was an Oil/Chemical tanker. Cargo lines were pressure tested at maximum working pressure 10 bars and no 1.5 X of W.P and also duration of test was not recorded on certificate.

209;    One UTI tape in use had bonding wire clip broken.

210;    220 volt feeder panel on emergency switchboard was showing low insulation of <0.1 m ohm.

211;    Manifold drip tray drain had one cock and no cap or plug was fitted.

212;    X-over line on all 3 manifolds had gooseneck air vent fitted with 2 cocks but no plug or cap were fitted.

213;    COT #1 (Port and Starboard) pressure sensors were out of order.

214;    Oil was found accumulated under main engine.

 215;   The vessel was received 1,000 MT of HFO at port Saoluis in Brazil on 25 June 2014 but this fact was not recorded in the oil record book part I. It was promptly recorded in the oil record book soon after point out. Master stated that vessel's bunker receiving record found in the engine log book on 25 June 2014.

216;    The machinery space is certified for unmanned operation but the vessel has been maintained in the manned operation at all times as per the operator's policy.

217;    The mooring wire/rope handling and mooring work areas of the poop deck was not effectively condition of non-slip surface due to new painted over.

 218;   The galley wastewater drain lines positioned in the provision store were made with PVC pipe and found 4 point of temporary repair with soft over.

219;    One sink positioned inside laundry on the upper deck was clogged and water accumulated.

220;    Steam chest pressure gauge for #3 Cargo Oil Pump Turbine in the Cargo Control Room was 'Out of Order' and did not reflect the true pressure reading.

221;    Engine room was on watch keeping instead of UMS.

222;    2 sets of vent heads wire mesh filters on the poop deck were damaged and broken at the time of inspection.

223;    The vessel didn't have any approved ECDIS, however it was noted that inside Form-E of Safety Equipment certificate dated 23 May 2014 that it was fitted with an ECDIS. The previous Form E records showed that the ECDIS did not form a part of the equipment.

224;    The recovery strops of suitable length with appropriate shackle and link were not provided for the recovery of rescue boat in the heavy weather to meet the amended SOLAS requirement.

225;    The accommodation ladders were not marked with minimum permitted design angle of inclination and its angle of slope does not exceed 45 when used in conjunction with pilot ladders. This observation was rectified in front of the inspector.

226;    The ICCP status was not exchanged between two STS vessels prior to switched-off on this vessel.

227;    Attending engineers were not familiar with Emergency Rudder Arrestor / Control fitted on the steering gear system.

228;    The 2nd Engineer had signed all entries in the oil record book part 1 rather than the officer actually in charge of the operation.

229;    The forward Emergency Towing Chain located at forecastle deck was heavily corroded and scale.

230;    The starboard side amidships plimsoll mark were not visible.

231;    Nut/bolts to flanges and isolation valves including “U” clamps in the fire line on deck were heavily corroded at places.

232;    Various service lines including nut/bolts to flanges and valves (to tanks cleaning lines, cable conduits, IG lines and cargo tank cleaning lines) on deck were heavily corroded at places.

234;    Vessel was loading gasoline in all the cargo tanks and tank vapour was observed venting through the P/V breaker at the time of inspection and not through the P/V valve(s). (P/V breaker had a pressure setting of 0.24 bar/ -0.07 Bar and P/V valves had pressure settings of 0.22 Bar/ 0.01 Bar) Suspect P/V breaker was actual operating at a lower pressure.

235;    Two synthetic mooring ropes (used as spring forward and a stern line) had worn out and had broken strands at places.

236;    Vessel's delivery date ' 20 January 2009' was incorrectly stated in IOPP Form B. Vessel was delivered on 20 January 2011.

237;    Limitations relating to the maximum permissible bollard pull (SWL 23.0 tons) from tugs that are to be utilized was stated in the pilot cards but tugs actual bollard pull was not completed in the Master and pilot information exchanges.

238;    Arrangement to monitor accumulation of gas in water ballast tanks no.4(C )  and 5 ( C ) double bottoms was not provided / fitted. These tanks were fitted directly below cargo tanks. Presently, regular monitoring was carried out from full depth sounding pip.

239;    Vessel was not provided with Class approved ballast water and sediments management plan.

240;    Arrangement to check or sample segregated ballast prior to de-ballasting from no.4(C ) and 5 ( C ) double bottoms was not provided / fitted. These tanks were fitted directly below cargo tanks.

241;    Stress and stability calculations were not performed. (Vessel was not provided with Class approved loading computer or programmed. )

242;    There was no certification on board to establish that vessel's boiler was specifically designed or modified for the use of low sulphur distillate fuels nor was an alternative method of heating provided.

 243;   Cargo lines annual pressure test was done on 087.10.2013 MWP was not mentioned. Duration of test was not mentioned.

 244;   There was no clear evidence that test of Navigation Light Failure Alarm System by removing fuse had been carried out regularly.

 245;   Comparison between Gyro Compass and Magnetic Compass heading after alteration course was not recorded on some occasion.

 246;    Ropes fitted for connection of smoke signal to life buoys on both bridge wing were worn out.

247;    Oil spill containment was fitted around port and starboard remote control stand for mooring winches on forecastle deck, but they were not plugged.

248;    Heavy spot rust was observed on some of COW branch lines. ( Actually , these lines were not used for COW but used tank cleaning before cargo change as the vessel engaged in CPP trade. )

249;    Oil seepage was observed at control level of one mooring winch on poop deck and two mooring winches on main deck.

250;    Two pedestal rollers were fitted between bow chain stopper and pick up rope storage drum to change the direction of pick up rope with making acute angle, approx. 70 degrees, at one pedestal roller.

251;    The cargo pump room was fitted with only one mechanical exhaust fan, however, spare motor and impeller not provided. ( No other means provided to ventilate the cargo pump room in case of failure of the single mechanical exhaust fan )

252;    Arrangement to monitor accumulation of gas in water ballast tanks no.4(C )  and 5 ( C ) double bottoms was not provided / fitted. These tanks were fitted directly below cargo tanks. Presently, regular monitoring was carried out from full depth sounding pipes.

253;    The man overboard self activating smoke / light float was fitted in board of both the full breadth bridge wings, as fitted when the lifebuoy is released the float will not drop overboard but onto the vessel.

254;    Vessel was not provided with Class approved ballast water and sediments management plan.

255;     Arrangement to check or sample segregated ballast prior to de-ballasting from no.4(C ) and 5 ( C ) double bottoms was not provided / fitted. These tanks were fitted directly below cargo tanks.

256;     Stress and stability calculations were not performed. (Vessel was not provided with Class approved loading computer or programmed. )

257;     A cylindrical stud was not attached to each presentation flange face at the 12 o'clock position on the flange bolt circle of each vapour return manifold.

258;    There was no certification on board to establish that vessel's boiler was specifically designed or modified for the use of low sulphur distillate fuels nor was an alternative method of heating provided.

 259;     Oil seepage was observed on hydraulic power unit in bosun store for mooring winches.

260;     Heavy rust was observed on hydraulic oil lines for the mooring winch located on main deck port side aft.

261;    Observed accommodation space atmosphere was not maintained higher than that of the ambient air.

 262;   Observed free fall life boat's air bottles pressure was showing 160 bars at the time, however it was recommended by the manufacturer as 200 bars.

263;    Observed fore peak tank manhole cover to remove numerous bolts to check that the ballast is free of oil.

264;    Observed high level audio and visual alarm did not activate on deck Suring test.

265;    Observed several critical spare required were not available on board as required by the operator’s minimum requirement.

266;    Vessel bunkered lube oils on 11 June 2014; quantity received was recorded in liters instead of tones in Oil Record Book Part 1.

267;    Survival craft two-way VHF equipment was also tested monthly on frequency channel 16.

268;    The forward most smoke fire detector located inside the trunking was erratic as fire alarm kept sounding.

269;    The general condition of the shipside was observed with scattered breakdown of paint coating and localized rusting in places.

270;    There was no non-skid paint applied on deck around the mooring areas when crew handling ropes on warping drums.

 271   The man overboard self activating smoke / light float was fitted in board of both the full breadth bridge wings, as fitted when the lifebuoy is released the float will not drop overboard but onto the vessel.

272;    Vessel was not provided with Class approved ballast water and sediments management plan.

273;    Testing of the cargo tanks remote pressure sensors was  included in vessel's in-house computerized PMS but results were not recorded/available.

274;    Lists of Radio Signals Volume 6 part 4 covering vessel's trading area was of old edition. Latest edition was published in week 32 of year 2014. Present week was 37 of year 2014.

 275;   There was no certification on board to establish that vessel's thermal oil boiler was specifically designed or modified for the use of low sulpur distillate fuels nor was an alternative method  of heating provided.

 278;    Boarding arrangement: A) Rigged pilot ladder on port side was observed provided only with three rubber steps instead of four. One rubber step was missing. B) Portable gangway was provided on board however it was not being used.

279;    Cargo tanks inspection : A) All cargo tanks were sighted from the deck level found well stripped. However, the record of cargo tanks max (reference) height with MMC was not available at the time of inspection. B) For MMC correction 308mm was allowed to get the corrected ullage of the liquid cargo in the tank. This correction was not mentioned in the ullage book. (Ch.off reported said on discharging vessel was showing loss cargo) Recommendation : All cargo tanks should be re-calibrated and max height for the cargo tanks should be ascertained with the MMC and correction applied to the MMC must be endorsed  by the competent survey company.

280;    The entire P/V breaker sight glass was internally coated with black residue and water level was not visible.

281;    There was no certification on board to establish that vessel's boiler was specifically designed or modified for the use of low sulphur distillate fuels nor was an alternative method of heating provided.

282;    At time of inspection, several pilot cards were sighted and 'Bow Thruster not working' was recorded of item 'Equipment Defects Relevant to Safe Navigation'.

283;    At least 30% of the main deck service pipelines (including cargo, inert gas, conduit, branch pipelines, pipe stands and supports) including flanges/bolts/nuts were covered with moderate to hard rust.

284;    Each bridge wing was fitted with 1kW halogen search light. (Requirement is minimum 2kW halogen searchlights)

285;    Training specifically addressing navigation in ice was not provided to members of the vessel's complement.

286;    Cold weather PPE and clothing was not provided on board.

287;    Only the sea chest of the hydraulic driven deep well ballast pumps was fitted with steam heating.

288;    Training specifically addressing operations in sub zero temperature was not provided to the vessel's complement.

289;    Cargo lines were pressure tested on 20th September 2013, however, maximum working pressure was not reported on the certificate.

  290;  Liquid level in PV breaker sight glass was not visible.

291;    Fire Control Plan had previous cargo MSDS and stowage plan.

292;    Observed forward life raft's embarkation ladder's side ropes were eroded.

 293;   Observed provision crane's hook latch was broken.

294;    The restricted in her ability to man oeuvre top red signal light was found inoperative at the time of inspection.

295;    Drills for emergency procedures structural failure not exercised and did not form a part of company approved annual drills planner.

296;    At the time of inspection the vessel's hyper mist fixed fire fighting installation system for engine room was in the manual mode and not on the automatic mode as per the system's operating manual.

297;    Pilot ladder in use on the port side only did not meet the latest SOLAS and IMPA guidelines approved construction and noted that the two ropes passing through steps were not continuous all the way and found sized with marlin rope under the bottom end steps.

298;    The port anchor chain visible length had one (1) loose stud with cracked welding.

299;    220V-'T' phase of main electric switch-board indicator inside engine control room showed significant earth-fault in the ships electrical circuit on the indicator lamp.

300;    No navigation light test procedure was in place on bridge, it was immediately rectified.

301;    The Third Engineer was not familiar with the operation of immersion suits which were stowed in engine control room, he did not realize the immersion suits were required to be donned the lifejacket in case of escape, he signed on board 4 months ago.

302;    Noted the pressure reading of No.2P and 2C cargo tanks pressure sensors incorrectly displayed respectively 249 mbars and -172 mbars at the time of inspection, IG main line pressure was 70 mbars.

303;    The lower button of gauge glass closing device served for auxiliary engine lube oil settling tank was inhibited at open position, it was immediately rectified.

304;    The Inert Gas System Condition checklist wrongly showed the requirement for inert gas delivery line as 8% instead of 5%.

305;    Marine growth observed on the hull between 8 to 14 meters draft and likely below. The vessel had been at anchor for long periods and had very short sailings.

306;    No evidence was found for the inspecting / trying out bridge navigational gears and equipments, prior to departure last anchorage or pre arrival at terminal.

307;    Slight to moderate hard rust and pitting were notice on main deck cargo, IG, fire / foam, bunker, electric conduce line, flanges and “U” flanges.

308;    Fwd and aft fire wires were corrected/ adjusted, during terminal safety inspection.

309;    The boots for the firemen's outfit were not provided with steel toes.

310;    Fire mans outfit boots were not provided with steel toe. Vessel had submitted requisition for the replacement.

311;    One of stern line way made fast on warping drum. Ship crew promptly rectified pointed one.

312;    Fire main line in the way of 3 wing Cargo oil tank was leaking in drops.

313;     There was oil traces, about 3cm in Vacuum seal water pump viewing glass at pump-room top platform.

314;    Section code 'R' for the ship and shore checklist was not completed, as agreed from terminal logistic.

415;    Fwd and aft fire wires were corrected/ adjusted, during terminal safety inspection.

316;    Deck duty personal was witness caring live mobile phone on deck.

317;    ECR 415 volts feeder panel was showing low insulation of <2.5 MΩ.

318;    On bridge deck port side the fire line pressure gauge was faulty (indicating 2.0kg/cm2) though the fire line was empty.

319;    ODME printout was faded as printer was out of cartridge ink. Note: As per records from Oil record book part II ODME was last tested on 11 September 2014

320    Pick-up hawser has to be led through one pedestal roller, making an angle of 90 degrees before reaching the winch storage drum.

321;    Cargo tanks high level alarm testing system was witness muted/ not operational in ‘CCR’.

  Ballast tanks “previous 2” operations sampling / inspection procedure was not correctly recorded, prior to de-ballasting.

322;    Cargo tanks P/V system hand operating levers found secured by external rope tails. Later take away by ship personals.

323;    ECR 440 volts feeder panels’ push button for inspecting insulation and audible warning alarm system was isolated from main.

324;    Bridge wing duck boards were broken in two places and adrift in another. Overall they were brittle from UV exposure and age fastening were consequently loose.

325 ;   Vessels name was not on the EPIRB label as required.

326;    Draft markings fore and aft the current water lines were illegible.

 327;   Most of the hydraulic valve local manual operating pump access point protection covers located throughout the main deck at deck level were corroded and broken and in at least two cases were adrift. They were newly and well painted bright yellow.