Oil Major Inspection Observation for the month of July 2014 to September 2014.

Oil Major Inspection Observation for the month of July 2014 to September 2014.

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 1;   Fire hose used to check the pressure of emergency fire pump was slightly leaking.

2;    Wilden pump was provided to deal with small oil spill on main deck port and starboard but discharge hoses were not connected to any drain tank/container.

  3;  Viewing glass for deck water seal and P/V breaker were dirty and not clear.

4;    Both port and starboard manifolds were full of oily/water mixture.

5;    Flange of port bunker manifold (MGO) was leaking in drops. Same rectified on spot.

6;    There was water accumulation at port and starboard side in forecastle store.

 7;   No evidence was found for the inspecting bridge navigational gears/ equipments, prior to departure last anchorage or pre arrival at terminal.

8;    Ships drawing/ plans were not found in ‘SMPEP’ manual.

9;    “CCR” cargo tanks audible alarm system was notice being intent allay disconnected from the main. Cargo tanks P/V system individual valves were not positively secured, against accidental operating.

10;    Ballast tanks sampling/ inspecting procedure was not followed, prior to de-ballasting at terminal. Section code “R” for SSSCL was not completed.

11;    ECR 415 volts feeder panel was showing low insulation of <3.0 M Ω. Duty personal was observed without safety helmet and safety ear muff.

12;    In ORB Part 1, Code 'H', item 26.3, was used for Lube oil bunkers.

13;    The 'quick closing valves' panel air reservoir pressure was set at 5 kg/cm2, less than recommended of 7 kg/cm2 as per instructions posted.

14;    Rescue / safety harness was provided at location for lifting an incapacitated person from bow thruster compartment and engine room emergency escape trunk but donning instructions were not available. Also, the rescue arrangement to bow thruster compartment i.e safety line and block was not rigged for immediate use.

 15;   Vessel last bunkered marine gas oil on 16 June 2014 at Noumea, New Caledonia but MSDS was not available.

16;    At time of inspection, the sight glass of the P/V breaker was internally coated with black residue and water level was not visible.

17;    The lead of the pick up rope from the stopper was via a pedestal roller to mooring winch. 18;The lead from the pedestal roller took a 90 degree turn to the mooring winch tension drum; the tension drum was not of sufficient size to accommodate 150 meters of 80 mm diameter rope. Vessel was fitted with hydraulic driven split type mooring winches.

19;    There was no certificate on board to establish that vessel's boiler was not specifically designed or modified for the use low sulpur distillate fuels nor was an alternative method of heating provided.

20;    The officers' matrix posted for the vessel on the SIRE website did not accurately reflect the information relating to the officers on board at the time of the inspection. The chief officer had a Class 1 certificate, but the matrix shown that he had only a Class 2 certificate.

 21;   Observed two different type of SARTs provided on board, noted one was of different type from ship-specific lifesaving equipment training manual.

22;    Fixed fire detection and alarm system was on manual mode.

23;    5 yearly test record of bow chain stopper was not available on board at the time.

24;    Observed two aft mooring tails were heavily stained and dark.

25;    Observed C deck door was corroded and wasted from bottom.

 26;   Hand rails were not fitted for getting onto embarkation ladders when rigged for port & starboard life boat/rafts.

 27;   Planned Maintenance System onboard does not contain job description to carry out 'Performance Test' of auxiliary engines. (Monthly performance tests of auxiliary engines were carried out at 430 kW while engines were rated 750 kW.)

28;    The rudder angle indicator located outside wheelhouse on starboard bridge wing was found with moisture adhered on the glass surface inside.

  29;  The erected fire curtain was  not provided or fitted in engine room workshop (The engine room workshop was not completely enclosed)

30;    In Oil Record Book Part 1, all entries made from 19 Oct 2013 to 05 July 2014 were signed at the end of each entry by the chief engineer. However, as confirmed by the chief engineer, the actual responsible person who carried out the operation was the second engineer.

31;    The nuts fitted on storm valves for engine room port side sea chest were found heavily rusted.

32;    At time of inspection, vessel only had one portable instrument for measuring oxygen. The other analyzer was landed ashore on 01 July 2014 for shore servicing/calibration (sighted landing report).

  33;  The on board 'Ballast water and sediments management plan ' was not Class or Administration approved.

  34;  The cargo tanks were not inspected within last 30 months. Last inspected in December 2011.

  35;   The portable tank cleaning hoses were not tested for electrical continuity prior to each use. The on board practice was to test the electrical continuity of all portable tank cleaning hoses monthly.

36;     The port and starboard davits of the life raft emergency lights were seized in over side positions.

37;    The Master was in possession of an ECDIS Generic Training certificate of one day duration and there was also no objective evidence to indicate that the course addressed each of the topics contained in the IMO Model Course 1.27.

38;    The smoking policy as part of the SMS did not include restrictions for the use of 'E-cigarettes'

39;    It was observed that the poop deck steering room entrance door was not closed during cargo discharge operations.

40;    It was observed that lifejackets provided (2 sets) at pilot access position (starboard) were not provided lights.

41;    It was observed that fire detector panel in fire station on upper deck was displaying "Fault", when queried the ship's staff explained that this was due to battery fault (trouble code:163)

42;    A review of the cargo oil record book (Part II) indicated that oily water slop had been disposed on 27 March 2014 at Singapore; however the port and quantity of disposed were not recorded in the ORB Part II (Code.J-57.1).

 43;   It was observed that drain plug for spill container of diesel oil tank located on funnel deck was not in place.

44;    A review of the lube oil analysis records on file did not show any records of lube oil analysis being done for the emergency generator. Nor was there a requirements as part of the planned maintenance system or otherwise to have the lube oil replaced periodically.

45;    In sewage Pollution Prevention Certificate, Section 1.3, total capacity of the sewage holding tank was not provided.

46;    Cancelled Navtex, message was not removed from BA Chart 4041 in use.

47;    Exhaust stacks of the main engine (1.no.), boilers (2 nos.) and generators (3 nos.) on the funnel were in rusted condition.

48;    The stern light (upper position) was found out of order at the time of inspection. It was rectified when inspector pointed out.

49;    It was found that the spectacle flanges for the tank cleaning heater inlet and outlet pipe were not blanked at the time of cargo discharging.

50;    Three pieces of elbow (diameter 200 mm) nearby the boiler circulating pumps were not secured in the port side in generators platform. It was rectified when inspector pointed out.

51;    The cargo cross over vent (goose neck) for cargo line number 1,2 & 3 (located between port and starboard cargo manifold) was provided with valves however not capped or plugged.

52;    Morring wire MBL were 1223.75 KN as per certificates onboard however nylon mooring tails MBL as per certificates were 160 T

53;    Two units of mooring chocks at F'cle deck had deep grooving.

54;    (i) Though vessel certified / equipped for UMS operation engine room was being manned throughout but Minimum Safe Manning certificate was issued only for UMS vessel (Periodically Unattended Machinery Space). (ii) Vessel recently completed her first Special Survey but (ESP) condition Evaluation Report was not available onboard.

55;    Vessel fitted with one (1) ECDIS but Master not attended shore-based ECDIS training. (He had undergone CBT-based training by SEAGULL & certificate issued on 29 October 2009 & a 1 day hands-on ECDIS training on 4 May 2011.)

56;    In the CO2 bottles f/f system room, the extraction fan was mounted at top side (0.5 m from deck head) of the side bulkhead but was not fitted with trunk arrangement extending down to the deck (floor) to endure effective extraction of any CO2 (heavier) gas out of th space.

57;    Vessel was built in 2009 but noted at foc'sle deck, the pick-up hawser from SPM to the (port/starboard) winch stowage drums were via one pedestal roller each; not direct lead to winch drum.

58;    Bridge Team Management course certificate of Master and 3rd officer did not declared the duration of course of at least 3 days. The only thing was declared on their certificates was date of issue.

59;    There was no documented evidence found inside section 8 of VDR annual performance test report by approved technician dated 13 Mar 2014 that interface of BNWAS was checked. (For info: the vessel was constructed after 01 Jul 2011.)

60;    The expiry dates of cartridges of all three (3) line throwing apparatus could not verified as they were not marked.

61;    The operational accuracy periodic checks of damage stability assessment by means of class approved test conditions was not practiced by the ship's staff. (for info: The vessel had Class ABS approved damage stability program inside the computer.)

62;    The lifting equipment annual thorough examination Class ABS report dated 21 Feb 2014 declared the location of 3.0T provision crane incorrectly as port side, whereas as physical check showed it was located on starboard side.

63;    Deck duty personal was not fully conversant with ship and shore checklist section code for the cargo operation.

64;    Engine room pre-arrival check list was not properly filled. Witness was not sign/ authenticated by senior engine room personal.

65;    It was observed that vsl accommodation w/t doors were kept open during discharging operation; - upper deck (port & stbd) - A deck ( port side ) - B deck ( port side ) - Paint store - Upper deck (aft), entrance to Engine room. W/t was shut immediately after duty officer was informed.

66;    It was observed that vessel's crew member was using a mobile phone at B deck port side, outside of vessel accommodation stain way platform.

67;    Cargo pump room two flooding dampers were open at the time of the inspection. (Closed once being pointed out.)

68;    More than 15 pieces of rags were noted on the cargo stripping pump and main cargo pumps in the cargo pump room. These rags were clean and free of oil and were removed once being pointed out.

69;    The gauge glass self-closing valve for lube oil store tank in the engine room was bound open.(bind was removed once being pointed.)

70;    The date of attendance was not indicated in the Bridge Team Management and Bridge Resource Management certificates of the Master.

71;    The fore Peak Tank (SBT ) of the vessel was located below a Void Space which was served by two large manholes on the main deck and their covers were secured in place by many bolts and entry from the Void Space into the Fore peak Tank was also via two man holes located on the tank top of the Fore Peak Tank hence, the opening of the covers was not easily inspection/checking of the ballast in the Fore Peak Tank prior to de-ballasting. The Fore Peak Tank was fitted with a sounding pipe.

72;    The second officer (A) was in possession of Bridge Team Management (BTM) certificates; however there was no objective evidence to indicate that the course was of three (3) days duration.

73;    1. The Master had not completed a generic ECDIS training course. 2. The second officer (A) and chief officer were in possession of ECDIS Generic Training certificates; however, there was also no objective evidence to indicate that the durations of the course and the course addressed the topics contained in the IMO Model Course 1.27, respectively.

74;    During the testing of cargo tank overflow alarms, it was observed that the external sound function of overflow alarm on deck (which was located on top of the bridge) was not operational.

75;    The top and lower (spring loaded valve) level glass gauging closing devices of the fuel tank of emergency diesel generator were observed left open (i.e lashed by wires)

76;    A significant earth fault of 0.7 mega ohms was observed on the 440V switchboard of exhaust fan motor in bosun store.

77;    The Fore Peak Tank (SBT) of the vessel was located below a Void Space which was served by two deck hatches on the main deck and entry from the Void Space into the Fore Peak Tank was via two large manholes located on the tank top of the Fore Peak Tank and their covers were secured in place by many bolts hence, the inspection and checking of ballast in the Fore Peak Tank was not easily achieved prior to de-ballasting. The Fore Peak Tank was fitted with a sampling/sounding pipe.

78;    Limitations relating to the maximum permissible bollard pull (SWL 46.0 tons) from tugs that are to be utilized was stated in the pilot cards but tugs actual bollard pull was not completed in the Master and pilot information exchanges.

79;    Times and locations of engaging hand steering when navigating through restricted waters was not recorded in deck log book or bell book.

80;    The required markings were not marked at the top platform of both accommodation ladders.

81;    Testing of the cargo tanks remote temperature and pressure sensors was included in vessel's in-house computerized PMS but results were not recorded/available.

82;    Cargo pump room fixed gas monitoring system measured %LEL, oxygen and H2S. However, the local gas detectors fitted in the cargo pump room were not identified as to which gas they measured.

83;    The life boat Recovery Strops and Hanging-off pendants were not provided for the Rescue boat recovery in the Heavy weather to meet the amended SOLAS requirement.

84;    The expiry dates of cartridges of all four (4) line throwing apparatus could not be verified as they were not marked.

85;    The expected Under Keel Clearance value on the lowest astronomical tide and in the worst case of trim was not calculated and UKC limitations did not form a part of the cargo plan.

 86;   The first three (3) stud-links from port side anchor chain swivel had two (2) studs missing and one (1) studded link was deformed. Reportedly the repair job was on request since 08 Aug 2014.

87;    The insulation rating could not be verified of non-conducting mats provided around the electrical switchboards exceeding 220 volts inside the engine room open space.

88;    No alarms activated on the bridge VDR panel when GPS and Echo Sounder was switched off.

89;    The fixed foam system provided on board was protein based alcohol, however last analysis dated 01 Oct 2014 did not include stability test with Acetone.

90;    As per the hose handling instruction booklet, vessel need to carry 43 pieces of complete set of hydraulic hoses, however there were only 9 hoses available on board.

91;    It states that Master carries out training for navigation in ice however the Master have not attended any sort of ice training.

92;    Bridge main fire monitoring/ extinction panel was showing system faults.

93;    Fixed foam last test due before 12th July 2014. Senior personal reported vessel had landed samples and waits for the lab results.

 94;   Fwd and aft (2+2) mooring ropes visual condition were notice fair. (Repeated)

95;    Engine control room 220 volts feeder panel was showing low insulation of < 1.6 M Ω.

96;    Mooring ropes original certificates were not available on board.

97;    Max venting capability was not displayed in CCR.

98;    The copy of the operator's navigation policy and procedures on the bridge was not updated at the time of inspection. Rectified before inspector leave the vessel.

99;    The pump room telephone audible alarm was not working at the time of inspection.

100;    Manufactures' instruction for the maintenance of the gas sampling system was not incorporated in PMS and had not been followed by ship staff.

101;    The use of Fall Prevention Devices (FDPs) was not incorporated in the ship specific life saving equipment training manual. Rectified before inspector leave the vessel.

102;    The sighting glass of the observation tank located at main deck was not transparent. 103 ;    The surface of water in the observation tank could not be seen.

 104;   The method employed to ensure that the tanks were dry was not recorded in record of previous COW operation.

105;    The Hydro-Motor of winch no 2 located at port side on main deck was drop leaking at the time of inspection. A plastic bucket had been located under the hydro-motor of the winch.

 106;    The main boilers were not running on auto mode at the time of inspection.

107;     The class approved fire plan available externally onboard did not use IMO resolution A.645 (16) recommended symbol colour (all symbols were in yellow colour).

108;     The cargo cross over drain for cross line 1,2 & 3 located between port and starboard cargo manifold was provided with valve however not capped or plugged. The port & Starboard bunker lines manifold located at amidships and forward of accommodation, it drains were provided with valves however not capped or plugged.

109;    The vessel single point mooring arrangement required the use of three pedestal roller to lead the hawser at acute angle to the winch storage drum and exposed winch operator to risk of whiplash injury.

200;    Starboard side accommodation ladder was missing. It was reported to have been off-landed ashore for repairs.

201;    Discharge of slops had been entered under item 'C' rather than item 'J' in the Oil Record Book, part II on 16-May-2014.

202;    Remote atmospheric pressure indicator of 2p cargo tank was defective and showing pressure of 10 mb; whereas, the pressure in tank was 47 mb.

203;    One of the two SAT C communication unit was consistently showing poor reception quality of signals, though both units had been connected to the same ocean region satellite and antenna of both units were next to each other, about 1.5m apart, on top of main mast clear of and above all obstructions including funnel.

204;    Cargo pump room was fitted with one fan. Spare motor for the pump room extraction fan was not available.

 205;   One of the hydrocarbon sensors to fixed gas detection system for the pump room was defective and displaying alarm.

206;    Rollers to various multi fairleads were frozen at the time of inspection.

207;    Superstructure block sighted with scattered spot rusting, rust staining and weeping at portholes. Main engine (1 nos,) & power pack (2 nos,) exhaust stacks on funnel were in rusted condition. Power pack exhaust stack (1 nos,) was thinned and holed.

208;    Vessel was an Oil/Chemical tanker. Cargo lines were pressure tested at maximum working pressure 10 bars and no 1.5 X of W.P and also duration of test was not recorded on certificate.

209;    One UTI tape in use had bonding wire clip broken.

210;    220 volt feeder panel on emergency switchboard was showing low insulation of <0.1 m ohm.

211;    Manifold drip tray drain had one cock and no cap or plug was fitted.

212;    X-over line on all 3 manifolds had gooseneck air vent fitted with 2 cocks but no plug or cap were fitted.

213;    COT #1 (Port and Starboard) pressure sensors were out of order.

214;    Oil was found accumulated under main engine.

 215;   The vessel was received 1,000 MT of HFO at port Saoluis in Brazil on 25 June 2014 but this fact was not recorded in the oil record book part I. It was promptly recorded in the oil record book soon after point out. Master stated that vessel's bunker receiving record found in the engine log book on 25 June 2014.

216;    The machinery space is certified for unmanned operation but the vessel has been maintained in the manned operation at all times as per the operator's policy.

217;    The mooring wire/rope handling and mooring work areas of the poop deck was not effectively condition of non-slip surface due to new painted over.

 218;   The galley wastewater drain lines positioned in the provision store were made with PVC pipe and found 4 point of temporary repair with soft over.

219;    One sink positioned inside laundry on the upper deck was clogged and water accumulated.

220;    Steam chest pressure gauge for #3 Cargo Oil Pump Turbine in the Cargo Control Room was 'Out of Order' and did not reflect the true pressure reading.

221;    Engine room was on watch keeping instead of UMS.

222;    2 sets of vent heads wire mesh filters on the poop deck were damaged and broken at the time of inspection.

223;    The vessel didn't have any approved ECDIS, however it was noted that inside Form-E of Safety Equipment certificate dated 23 May 2014 that it was fitted with an ECDIS. The previous Form E records showed that the ECDIS did not form a part of the equipment.

224;    The recovery strops of suitable length with appropriate shackle and link were not provided for the recovery of rescue boat in the heavy weather to meet the amended SOLAS requirement.

225;    The accommodation ladders were not marked with minimum permitted design angle of inclination and its angle of slope does not exceed 45 when used in conjunction with pilot ladders. This observation was rectified in front of the inspector.

226;    The ICCP status was not exchanged between two STS vessels prior to switched-off on this vessel.

227;    Attending engineers were not familiar with Emergency Rudder Arrestor / Control fitted on the steering gear system.

228;    The 2nd Engineer had signed all entries in the oil record book part 1 rather than the officer actually in charge of the operation.

229;    The forward Emergency Towing Chain located at forecastle deck was heavily corroded and scale.

230;    The starboard side amidships plimsoll mark were not visible.

231;    Nut/bolts to flanges and isolation valves including “U” clamps in the fire line on deck were heavily corroded at places.

232;    Various service lines including nut/bolts to flanges and valves (to tanks cleaning lines, cable conduits, IG lines and cargo tank cleaning lines) on deck were heavily corroded at places.

234;    Vessel was loading gasoline in all the cargo tanks and tank vapour was observed venting through the P/V breaker at the time of inspection and not through the P/V valve(s). (P/V breaker had a pressure setting of 0.24 bar/ -0.07 Bar and P/V valves had pressure settings of 0.22 Bar/ 0.01 Bar) Suspect P/V breaker was actual operating at a lower pressure.

235;    Two synthetic mooring ropes (used as spring forward and a stern line) had worn out and had broken strands at places.

236;    Vessel's delivery date ' 20 January 2009' was incorrectly stated in IOPP Form B. Vessel was delivered on 20 January 2011.

237;    Limitations relating to the maximum permissible bollard pull (SWL 23.0 tons) from tugs that are to be utilized was stated in the pilot cards but tugs actual bollard pull was not completed in the Master and pilot information exchanges.

238;    Arrangement to monitor accumulation of gas in water ballast tanks no.4(C )  and 5 ( C ) double bottoms was not provided / fitted. These tanks were fitted directly below cargo tanks. Presently, regular monitoring was carried out from full depth sounding pip.

239;    Vessel was not provided with Class approved ballast water and sediments management plan.

240;    Arrangement to check or sample segregated ballast prior to de-ballasting from no.4(C ) and 5 ( C ) double bottoms was not provided / fitted. These tanks were fitted directly below cargo tanks.

241;    Stress and stability calculations were not performed. (Vessel was not provided with Class approved loading computer or programmed. )

242;    There was no certification on board to establish that vessel's boiler was specifically designed or modified for the use of low sulphur distillate fuels nor was an alternative method of heating provided.

 243;   Cargo lines annual pressure test was done on 087.10.2013 MWP was not mentioned. Duration of test was not mentioned.

 244;   There was no clear evidence that test of Navigation Light Failure Alarm System by removing fuse had been carried out regularly.

 245;   Comparison between Gyro Compass and Magnetic Compass heading after alteration course was not recorded on some occasion.

 246;    Ropes fitted for connection of smoke signal to life buoys on both bridge wing were worn out.

247;    Oil spill containment was fitted around port and starboard remote control stand for mooring winches on forecastle deck, but they were not plugged.

248;    Heavy spot rust was observed on some of COW branch lines. ( Actually , these lines were not used for COW but used tank cleaning before cargo change as the vessel engaged in CPP trade. )

249;    Oil seepage was observed at control level of one mooring winch on poop deck and two mooring winches on main deck.

250;    Two pedestal rollers were fitted between bow chain stopper and pick up rope storage drum to change the direction of pick up rope with making acute angle, approx. 70 degrees, at one pedestal roller.

251;    The cargo pump room was fitted with only one mechanical exhaust fan, however, spare motor and impeller not provided. ( No other means provided to ventilate the cargo pump room in case of failure of the single mechanical exhaust fan )

252;    Arrangement to monitor accumulation of gas in water ballast tanks no.4(C )  and 5 ( C ) double bottoms was not provided / fitted. These tanks were fitted directly below cargo tanks. Presently, regular monitoring was carried out from full depth sounding pipes.

253;    The man overboard self activating smoke / light float was fitted in board of both the full breadth bridge wings, as fitted when the lifebuoy is released the float will not drop overboard but onto the vessel.

254;    Vessel was not provided with Class approved ballast water and sediments management plan.

255;     Arrangement to check or sample segregated ballast prior to de-ballasting from no.4(C ) and 5 ( C ) double bottoms was not provided / fitted. These tanks were fitted directly below cargo tanks.

256;     Stress and stability calculations were not performed. (Vessel was not provided with Class approved loading computer or programmed. )

257;     A cylindrical stud was not attached to each presentation flange face at the 12 o'clock position on the flange bolt circle of each vapour return manifold.

258;    There was no certification on board to establish that vessel's boiler was specifically designed or modified for the use of low sulphur distillate fuels nor was an alternative method of heating provided.

 259;     Oil seepage was observed on hydraulic power unit in bosun store for mooring winches.

260;     Heavy rust was observed on hydraulic oil lines for the mooring winch located on main deck port side aft.

261;    Observed accommodation space atmosphere was not maintained higher than that of the ambient air.

 262;   Observed free fall life boat's air bottles pressure was showing 160 bars at the time, however it was recommended by the manufacturer as 200 bars.

263;    Observed fore peak tank manhole cover to remove numerous bolts to check that the ballast is free of oil.

264;    Observed high level audio and visual alarm did not activate on deck Suring test.

265;    Observed several critical spare required were not available on board as required by the operator’s minimum requirement.

266;    Vessel bunkered lube oils on 11 June 2014; quantity received was recorded in liters instead of tones in Oil Record Book Part 1.

267;    Survival craft two-way VHF equipment was also tested monthly on frequency channel 16.

268;    The forward most smoke fire detector located inside the trunking was erratic as fire alarm kept sounding.

269;    The general condition of the shipside was observed with scattered breakdown of paint coating and localized rusting in places.

270;    There was no non-skid paint applied on deck around the mooring areas when crew handling ropes on warping drums.

 271   The man overboard self activating smoke / light float was fitted in board of both the full breadth bridge wings, as fitted when the lifebuoy is released the float will not drop overboard but onto the vessel.

272;    Vessel was not provided with Class approved ballast water and sediments management plan.

273;    Testing of the cargo tanks remote pressure sensors was  included in vessel's in-house computerized PMS but results were not recorded/available.

274;    Lists of Radio Signals Volume 6 part 4 covering vessel's trading area was of old edition. Latest edition was published in week 32 of year 2014. Present week was 37 of year 2014.

 275;   There was no certification on board to establish that vessel's thermal oil boiler was specifically designed or modified for the use of low sulpur distillate fuels nor was an alternative method  of heating provided.

 278;    Boarding arrangement: A) Rigged pilot ladder on port side was observed provided only with three rubber steps instead of four. One rubber step was missing. B) Portable gangway was provided on board however it was not being used.

279;    Cargo tanks inspection : A) All cargo tanks were sighted from the deck level found well stripped. However, the record of cargo tanks max (reference) height with MMC was not available at the time of inspection. B) For MMC correction 308mm was allowed to get the corrected ullage of the liquid cargo in the tank. This correction was not mentioned in the ullage book. (Ch.off reported said on discharging vessel was showing loss cargo) Recommendation : All cargo tanks should be re-calibrated and max height for the cargo tanks should be ascertained with the MMC and correction applied to the MMC must be endorsed  by the competent survey company.

280;    The entire P/V breaker sight glass was internally coated with black residue and water level was not visible.

281;    There was no certification on board to establish that vessel's boiler was specifically designed or modified for the use of low sulphur distillate fuels nor was an alternative method of heating provided.

282;    At time of inspection, several pilot cards were sighted and 'Bow Thruster not working' was recorded of item 'Equipment Defects Relevant to Safe Navigation'.

283;    At least 30% of the main deck service pipelines (including cargo, inert gas, conduit, branch pipelines, pipe stands and supports) including flanges/bolts/nuts were covered with moderate to hard rust.

284;    Each bridge wing was fitted with 1kW halogen search light. (Requirement is minimum 2kW halogen searchlights)

285;    Training specifically addressing navigation in ice was not provided to members of the vessel's complement.

286;    Cold weather PPE and clothing was not provided on board.

287;    Only the sea chest of the hydraulic driven deep well ballast pumps was fitted with steam heating.

288;    Training specifically addressing operations in sub zero temperature was not provided to the vessel's complement.

289;    Cargo lines were pressure tested on 20th September 2013, however, maximum working pressure was not reported on the certificate.

  290;  Liquid level in PV breaker sight glass was not visible.

291;    Fire Control Plan had previous cargo MSDS and stowage plan.

292;    Observed forward life raft's embarkation ladder's side ropes were eroded.

 293;   Observed provision crane's hook latch was broken.

294;    The restricted in her ability to man oeuvre top red signal light was found inoperative at the time of inspection.

295;    Drills for emergency procedures structural failure not exercised and did not form a part of company approved annual drills planner.

296;    At the time of inspection the vessel's hyper mist fixed fire fighting installation system for engine room was in the manual mode and not on the automatic mode as per the system's operating manual.

297;    Pilot ladder in use on the port side only did not meet the latest SOLAS and IMPA guidelines approved construction and noted that the two ropes passing through steps were not continuous all the way and found sized with marlin rope under the bottom end steps.

298;    The port anchor chain visible length had one (1) loose stud with cracked welding.

299;    220V-'T' phase of main electric switch-board indicator inside engine control room showed significant earth-fault in the ships electrical circuit on the indicator lamp.

300;    No navigation light test procedure was in place on bridge, it was immediately rectified.

301;    The Third Engineer was not familiar with the operation of immersion suits which were stowed in engine control room, he did not realize the immersion suits were required to be donned the lifejacket in case of escape, he signed on board 4 months ago.

302;    Noted the pressure reading of No.2P and 2C cargo tanks pressure sensors incorrectly displayed respectively 249 mbars and -172 mbars at the time of inspection, IG main line pressure was 70 mbars.

303;    The lower button of gauge glass closing device served for auxiliary engine lube oil settling tank was inhibited at open position, it was immediately rectified.

304;    The Inert Gas System Condition checklist wrongly showed the requirement for inert gas delivery line as 8% instead of 5%.

305;    Marine growth observed on the hull between 8 to 14 meters draft and likely below. The vessel had been at anchor for long periods and had very short sailings.

306;    No evidence was found for the inspecting / trying out bridge navigational gears and equipments, prior to departure last anchorage or pre arrival at terminal.

307;    Slight to moderate hard rust and pitting were notice on main deck cargo, IG, fire / foam, bunker, electric conduce line, flanges and “U” flanges.

308;    Fwd and aft fire wires were corrected/ adjusted, during terminal safety inspection.

309;    The boots for the firemen's outfit were not provided with steel toes.

310;    Fire mans outfit boots were not provided with steel toe. Vessel had submitted requisition for the replacement.

311;    One of stern line way made fast on warping drum. Ship crew promptly rectified pointed one.

312;    Fire main line in the way of 3 wing Cargo oil tank was leaking in drops.

313;     There was oil traces, about 3cm in Vacuum seal water pump viewing glass at pump-room top platform.

314;    Section code 'R' for the ship and shore checklist was not completed, as agreed from terminal logistic.

415;    Fwd and aft fire wires were corrected/ adjusted, during terminal safety inspection.

316;    Deck duty personal was witness caring live mobile phone on deck.

317;    ECR 415 volts feeder panel was showing low insulation of <2.5 MΩ.

318;    On bridge deck port side the fire line pressure gauge was faulty (indicating 2.0kg/cm2) though the fire line was empty.

319;    ODME printout was faded as printer was out of cartridge ink. Note: As per records from Oil record book part II ODME was last tested on 11 September 2014

320    Pick-up hawser has to be led through one pedestal roller, making an angle of 90 degrees before reaching the winch storage drum.

321;    Cargo tanks high level alarm testing system was witness muted/ not operational in ‘CCR’.

  Ballast tanks “previous 2” operations sampling / inspection procedure was not correctly recorded, prior to de-ballasting.

322;    Cargo tanks P/V system hand operating levers found secured by external rope tails. Later take away by ship personals.

323;    ECR 440 volts feeder panels’ push button for inspecting insulation and audible warning alarm system was isolated from main.

324;    Bridge wing duck boards were broken in two places and adrift in another. Overall they were brittle from UV exposure and age fastening were consequently loose.

325 ;   Vessels name was not on the EPIRB label as required.

326;    Draft markings fore and aft the current water lines were illegible.

 327;   Most of the hydraulic valve local manual operating pump access point protection covers located throughout the main deck at deck level were corroded and broken and in at least two cases were adrift. They were newly and well painted bright yellow.